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PREFACE 
The revolution that drove Porfirio Diaz from Mexico and carried 
Francisco "Pancho" Villa to the front pages of American newspapers 
began innocently enough as a liberal protest against rigged elections. 
The subsequent decade-long struggle left Mexico in economic and 
social chaos while it built the groundwork for her political stability 
in the twentieth century. The actions of Pancho Villa, commander of 
the Division of the North, largely dictated the course of the revolution 
from early 1913 until his eclipse from power in the summer of 1915. 
Like other revolutionaries, Villa needed ordnance and materiel so 
that his army could achieve victory in the field. Revolutionaries of 
all factions required supplies to maintain the efficiency of their 
organizations. Because he dominated Chihuahua and other States of 
northern Mexico, Villa's supply system had to rely chiefly upon 
United States sources throughout his campaigns. 
From the beginning of his career, Villa realized the critical 
importance of maintaining an efficient supply network to fuel his army. 
Without cordial ties with the United States, that network would have 
been jeopardized and his army vulnerable. His need for munitions in 
part dictated his actions toward the United States and toward Americans 
-  i i  -
in Mexico. In addition, the success or failure of his supply system to 
outfit his army played a role in actions in combat and his military 
strategy. This study will trace the foundations of his supply system, 
its relationship to the policies Villa carried forth, and the impact that 
system had on Villa's ultimate demise. 
Stewart, Christopher R. , M.A., 1979 History 
Pancho Villa's Munitions (140 pp.) 
Director: Manuel Machado / / 
This study examined the structure and function of Francisco "Pancho" 
Villa's ordnance and munition system from the outset of 1913 until the 
end of 1915. The study sought to establish the relationship between 
Villa's military successes and failures in the Mexican Revolution and 
his supply organization. Because Villa often publicly stressed the 
importance of munitions in explaining his campaigns, special atten­
tion was given to Villa's public claims about supply and the actual 
state of his ordnance strength as determined by this research. 
In orderto determine the origin of Villa's military supplies, how 
Villa financed payment, and what quantities he accumulated during 
the three years of the Mexican Revolution analyzed in this, several 
primary sources were used. After consulting a wide-range of secon­
dary works, research focused heavily on Records of the Department of 
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929, Record 
Group 59, National Archives, M-274, Call Number 502. In addition, 
other critical information came from The Foreign Relations of the 
United States, The American Republics, 1913, 1914, 1915; The New 
York Times; The William F. Buckley Papers; and The United States 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (Fall Committee) 1919-1920, 
Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 . Because Villa purchased almost all of his muni­
tions through the United States, research relied on no Mexican language 
material. 
This study reached several conclusions. Munition supply proved 
important to Villa's early military success in the revolution prior to 
December 1914. After that time, the acquisition of munitions was 
less critical to Villa's military demise than his faulty tactics, contrary 
to the explanations (given by Villa). Research showed that Villa's 
army was well supplied with munitions throughout the decisive summer 
of 1915. His pivotal defeats at Celaya and Leon were not the result of 
a breakdown in supply but rather because he lacked sound military 
judgement. Research also supported other studies which linked 
Germany with Mexican revolutionaries. The quantity of munitions 
Villa received indicated that German financing of Villa most certainly 
began as early as April 1915, several months prior to the date hereto­
fore suspected. 
-  iv  -
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Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico for thirty-five years. At the end of 
his long reign in 1910, mass discontent with his government had 
reached a point at which opposition, no matter how timid, met popular 
support. Francisco Madero, an eccentric hacendado, campaigned 
vigorously and unsuccessfully to unseat Diaz from the Presidency in 
the elections of 1910. Madero escaped to the United States. Labeling 
the elections a fraud, Madero issued a manifesto—known as the Plan 
of San Luis Potosi—calling on the Mexican people to revolt against 
the old dictator. Much to the surprise of all, this appeal drew wide­
spread support. Simultaneous rebellions in Morelos, Mexico City, 
and Chihuahua led to Diaz's resignation and the subsequent election 
of Madero as President in the fall of 1911 . Madero discovered that 
victory over Diaz was more easily achieved than the pacification of 
Mexico. In February 1913, Victoriano Huerta directed a revolt which 
toppled Madero's government and threw Mexico into renewed civil war. 
News of the coup traveled quickly to El Paso, Texas, where 
Pancho Villa had temporarily established a home. Villa had good cause 
to oppose the Huerta takeover. During Madero's revolt against Diaz, 
2  
Villa allied himself with the rebels and served as a captain in the 
revolutionary army. Prior to joining Madero, Villa had spent most 
2 of his adult life as a bandit in Chihuahua and Durango. His mainstay 
had been cattle rustling. Having been a lifelong outlaw, Villa had a 
* 
natural reason to oppose the Diaz government. Villa met Don Abraham 
Gonzalez, the future governor of Chihuahua, and the two men became 
fast friends. Gonz'alez, the leader of Madero's Anti-Reelectionist 
movement in Chihuahua, convinced Villa to join the rebellion against 
3 Diaz. 
Villa developed what one historian has called an "almost doglike 
devotion" to Madero.^ Madero's sincere concern for the plight of the 
common people impressed Villa who had been accustomed to encounter­
ing exploitation and harassment from the wealthy. Madero returned 
Villa's loyalty—a quality Villa valued above all others in his friend­
ships—many times over. He pardoned Villa's past crimes and 
publicly defended Villa to the press. Madero told the El Paso Times 
that Villa's banditry had been caused by the oppression and tyranny of 
the Diaz government and that Villa deserved praise for his work in 
5 
the revolution. At the end of the Madero rebellion, Villa retired 
from service in the revolutionary army to settle in Chihuahua. The 
Madero government gave him a large stipend as a reward for his 
services. 
3  
Villa's retirement lasted only several months. By March 1912, 
Pascual Orozco, Jr., had begun yet another rebellion against the 
Madero government from his stronghold of Chihuahua.^ Villa fled 
to the mountains of Chihuahua, formed an army of his veteran troops, 
and began a campaign against Orozco. Meanwhile, Madero dispatched 
General Victoriano Huerta from Mexico City to quell the rebellion and 
ordered Villa to serve under him. Villa and Huerta, both accustomed 
to command, soon quarrelled violently. The cause of the dispute 
remained unclear but the outcome did not. Huerta arrested Villa 
for insubordination and placed him in front of a firing squad.7 Through 
the efforts of Colonel Rubio Navarrete and Raul Madero, the President's 
brother, Villa escaped death by a narrow margin and was instead 
Q  
transferred to the penitentiary in Mexico City. Villa passed three 
months in jail learning rudimentary reading and writing, skills which 
he had not acquired in his youth. On September 16, 1912 Villa eluded 
g 
his captors, walking out of his cell disguised in a pair of sunglasses. 
The ease with which he escaped confinement suggested that the 
authorities were not opposed to his flight.^ 
Villa made his way to exile in the United States crossing the 
border at Nogales, Arizona and eventually settling in El Paso. Having 
learned of an impending coup against Madero, Villa attempted to warn 
Madero through messages to Abraham Gonzalez. The plotters had 
even offered Villa a chance to participate. This warning did little good. 
4  
Huerta's coup, and the subsequent executions of Madero and Vice 
President Pino Suarez, enraged Villa. The later execution of 
jr n -I 
Abraham Gonzalez cemented Villa's hatred for Huerta. Not only 
were the two men he most admired murdered but Huerta and Orozco— 
the persons responsible for these acts, in Villa's eyes—were already 
his bitter enemies. 
The details of Villa's entry into Mexico to start his campaign 
12 against Huerta remained hazy and contradictory. It was clear that 
prior to departing from El Paso, Villa received a small loan from 
Gonzalez, some money from his brother Hipolito, and 1,500 pesos from 
Jose Maria Maytorena, then governor of Sonora. Some time in late 
March or early April 1913, Villa crossed the border in the vicinity 
of Columbus, New Mexico, with eight companions. Sixteen months 
later Villa would command an army of 40,000 men. 
The Porous Border 
Revolutionary bands formed spontaneously throughout Mexico in 
13 
opposition to Huerta's takeover. The strongest center of rebellion 
was in the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and 
Sonora, all having contiguous borders with the United States. Villa 
and others who joined the anti-Huerta movement immediately under­
stood the importance of American support to the success of their 
efforts. In order to defeat Huerta, arms and ammunition had to be 
5  
gathered. Huerta, who ran the official government of Mexico, imported 
munitions directly from the United States until July 1913 and from 
Europe and Japan until he fled from Mexico in August 1914. The sale 
of munitions of war to Mexico had been declared illegal by order of a 
Presidential Proclamation of March 14, 1912; however, exceptions 
to this embargo were routinely made for the Federal Government of 
Mexico. The rebels, of course, resented this. Rebel leaders tele­
graphed the President and the State Department praising the 
non-recognition of Huerta and beseeching the government to allow them 
14 to purchase munitions. Until February 3, 1914, the United States 
government denied the rebels their wish. 
American responses to the Mexican revolution varied dramatically, 
especially regarding the export of munitions into Mexico. At the out-
• 
set of the Madero-led revolt against Diaz, President Taft and his 
Secretary of State Philander Knox attempted to sustain a strictly 
neutral attitude toward the rebels. Despite the protests of the Diaz 
government demanding that the rebels be denied access to arms, Taft 
refused to curtail this trade. Taft believed that no United States laws 
1 5 were broken in the mere purchase of arms by the rebels. Because 
no insurrection had been organized in American territory, the rebels 
remained within the law. In any event, munitions provided to the 
'  16 rebels through American sources had no bearing on Diaz's defeat. 
6  
Although Taft would have preferred to keep his policy of neutral­
ity toward the revolution in Mexico, changing conditions forced him to 
alter that position. He had refused to take action in Mexico in part 
because he accepted a more limited Presidential role and because he 
felt any intervention in Mexico's internal affairs would place Americans 
and American property in Mexico in dangerous straits. Yet by early 
1912 that policy showed itself to be ineffective. Americans and 
American holdings in northern Mexico suffered from mounting numbers 
of rebel outrages while the Madero government appeared incapable of 
remedying the situation. Taft's dilemma hinged on arms trading. 
"The paradoxical part about the whole matter," Atwater affirmed, 
"was that the revolutionists who were threatening and menacing 
American lives and property were receiving their arms and ammuni­
tion across the border from the United States, especially through the 
frontier towns of Texas. 7 By late February, Taft began to move 
more forcibly. Partially because of Henry Lane Wilson's warnings of 
impending anarchy, Taft had ordered that army strength along the 
1 R border be increased. Through this show of force, Taft hoped to 
impress Madero with the seriousness of his commitment to Americans 
in Mexico. Still, this was not enough. 
By March 1912, Taft realized he had to take more drastic 
action—short of intervention—if Americans were to be safeguarded. 
Since American investment and American citizens in Mexico were 
7  
predominantly in the north, and since rebel power centered in the 
19 
same regions, Taft found his options quite limited. Any American 
action favoring the Madero government would be interpreted as a 
hostile move by the rebels; thus, Americans would be targeted for 
increased reprisals. Taft restrained from direct intervention 
PO because that act would certainly provoke the killing of Americans . 
He also had to consider the possibility that prolonged anarchy in 
2 1  
Mexico would encourage European intervention. 
The final incident that impelled Taft to act came in late 
February. Taft already knew that the northern rebels were decidedly 
anti-American from the continuous missives from Henry Lane 
22 
Wilson. At the end of the month, the rebels captured Ciudad 
Juarez, the center for arms imports from the city of El Paso just 
23 
across the Rio Grande. On March 2, 1913, Americans living in 
troubled regions were requested to seek safety; less than two weeks 
later an embargo on the shipment of munitons into Mexico was 
^ 24 imposed. 
25 The Madero government had long-pressed for just such an act. 
However, as first employed, the embargo denied munitions to both 
rebel and government buyers. The Presidential Proclamation cut off 
all shipments, although the Joint Congressional Resolution empowered 
the president to grant exceptions to the embargo. By March 26, Taft 
26 
decided to permit Madero's government to import munitions. This 
8  
policy remained in effect through the remainder of 1912 and well into 
1913 for the official government of Mexico. The hesitation in granting 
import privileges to Madero's government may have been made in 
hopes of delaying rebel reprisals against American properties and 
citizens. By making no special announcement of this action, Taft 
might have hoped to disguise American policy and thus to forestall 
rebel retaliation. If so, he failed. The rebels markedly increased 
07 
their attacks on United States citizens and property. 
Woodrow Wilson faced similar difficulties in Mexico and he, too, 
used the regulation of arms exports as an instrument of his policy. 
His aims in Mexico had an entirely different focus than those of Taft. 
Instead of professing a primary concern for the safety of American 
lives and property,, Wilson worked to bring an American-style 
democracy to that country. He applied the "kernel of his domestic 
28 
policy" to foreign affairs. However nobel an aim this may have been, 
29 
Wilson used the wrong tactics to implement this goal. 
Huerta's late February coup coincided with the lame duck days 
of Taft's administration. Although American Ambassador Wilson 
pressed for recognition of the new Mexican government, Taft decided 
to put off his decision. He left this choice to the incoming President. 
The issue of American response to the revolution had been effectively 
used against Taft in the 1912 campaign. Democrats criticized Taft for 
30 
his apparent ineptitude in aiding Americans in Mexico. Taft may have 
9  
found satisfaction by deferring this delicate problem to Wilson. The 
hostile American press reaction to the assassinations of Madero and 
Suarez also contributed to Taft's postponement of recognition. In 
addition, several unresolved territorial disputes and claims against 
the Mexican government for damages suffered during the revolution 
had to be considered. Taft and Knox also had to gain assurances that 
the new government of Mexico was willing to safeguard foreigners 
31 
living in Mexico. 
In any case, Wilson opposed recognition. He announced on 
March 11, 1913 that "we have no sympathy with those who seek to 
seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests 
32 or ambition." Clearly, he intended this as a warning to Huerta. In 
a statement not intended for public perusal, he made his stand even 
q q  
more emphatic: "I will not recognize a government of butchers." 
Coming as these statements did before the end of May 1913, Wilson was 
evidently determined to force Huerta from power. Not only had Huerta 
illegally deposed a democratically formed government, Wilson felt, 
but he had compounded his sin with the murders of Madero and Suarez. 
Wilson's attitude toward the Huerta government contributed to 
the ease with which rebel bands were able to circumvent the law and 
secure munitions. This factor alone, though, did not explain the 
great success smugglers enjoyed from the advent of their rebellion 
against Huerta. If Wilson had seriously intended to enforce the 
10  
embargo, more effective means to do so were at his disposal. The 
fact that he refrained from sending more agents or ordering Army 
personnel to assist border patrols was not based on a lack of informa­
tion about the prevalence of smuggling. Agents from the border sent 
ample and frequent reports to Washington complaining of the ongoing 
illicit arms trade. Kenneth Grieb believed that Wilson's inaction and 
the absence of specific directives from the State and Treasury 
Departments indicated "that Washington was at least unconcerned about 
34 the problem." Evidence supported his analysis. 
The border between the United States and Mexico presented an 
immense challenge to any police force. Stretching approximately 
1 ,600 miles, unfenced, and largely unpatrolled, the opportunities it 
presented for undetected crossing were innumerable. Aside from 
geographic convenience for smuggling, those charged with implement­
ing the embarge faced a hostile population. The sympathies of people 
along the border decidedly favored the rebel cause. Consul Marion 
Letcher in Chihuahua made a sound summary of the border atmosphere 
when he reported, "to be anybody or anything among them, one must 
35 
be an active supporter and adherent of the Mexican rebellion." 
Other factors contributed to the pro-rebel sympathy along the 
border. Tasker H. Bliss, the Commanding General of the Army's 
Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston Texas, cited the political 
clout of the Mexican-American population in influencing the border 
1 1  
community to aid the rebels. He also pointed out that those who helped 
the smugglers received special compensation from the rebels; their 
cattle were not as apt to be stolen. Merchants who catered to 
rebel needs both in illicit arms and non-military supplies also backed 
the rebellion because it augumented their trade. 
Those charged with prevention of smuggling acted less than 
zealously in discharging their duties. The Mexican Embassy in 
Washington complained that the authorities in El Paso openly assisted 
rebel smugglers while treating the officers of the Mexican government 
37 
with contempt. The Collector of Customs in Brownsville, Frank 
Rabb, was the object of numerous protests from the Mexican Federal 
Government; they pointed out that Rabb was a close friend of General 
Luis Blanco, the commander of the Constitutionalist troops who had 
38 captured Matamoros. Matamoros, of course, was just across the 
river from Brownsville. Department of Justice agent C.E. Breniman 
observed that the Custom house at Douglas, Arizona, across the 
border from the rebel-held town of Agua Prieta, only made a pretense 
39 
of inspecting carts and wagons which passed across the boundary. 
Even the Army patrols were implicated; the troops along the Arizona 
border were accused of accepting bribes to allow smugglers to carry 
40 
on their work. 
To facilitate smuggling, the rebels employed a variety of 
devices which escaped detection and some devices which did not. The 
12  
clandestine competition between rebel smugglers and American 
authorities also involved agents of the Mexican Federal Government. 
These Mexican agents kept close watch over the illicit arms traders 
and frequently fed this information to United States Department of 
Justice agents. At times, the tips which Mexican agents furnished to 
their American counterparts bordered on the ridiculous. The Mexican 
Consul in New Orleans told Department of Justice agents that the rebel 
smugglers had concealed ammunition in piano crates intended for 
41 
shipment to El Paso. A careful search revealed no such shipment. 
Mexican agents learned that the rebels planned to ship munitions 
into Agua Prieta cleverly hidden in cans of tomatoes, although diligent 
searches by Department of Justice agents failed to turn up the ammuni-
42 
tion. In another false lead, Mexican agents in New York City clued 
American authorities onto the fact that the steam ship SUME carried 
43 
a cargo of arms for the rebels; again, searches found no such cargo. 
Still, not all the preposterous sounding tips from Mexican 
agents merited dismissal. On the contrary, many of the fears they 
expressed about rebel smuggling were substantiated. Consul 
* 
Arturo M. Elias in El Paso accused the Shelton-Payne Arms Company 
of that city of complicity in a plot to deliver 212,000 cartridges and 
1 ,000 rifles to the rebels in late May 1913. Department of Justice 
agents spoke to Mr. Payne and found that he indeed engaged in 
frequent sales to the rebels. An agent reported: 
1 3  
"Mr. Payne frankly admitted that he had been down to Del 
Rio and other points proximate to the border for the express 
purpose of getting orders for guns and ammunition as that 
is his business, and he believes he is well within his rights 
so long as he does absolutely nothing to assist in getting 
the goods across the border, which Mr. Payne stated his 
firm has time and again refused to do.  "44 
Arms dealers along the border showed themselves more than 
willing to aid the rebels to circumvent the feeble detection system 
thrown up by the American government. Hardware dealers and dry 
goods merchants along the border imported large stores of cartridges 
45 and guns, which they sold in small lots to anyone with sufficient funds. 
To the inquiries of Justice Department agents as to where the munitions 
were bound and who purchased them, dealers turned a cold shoulder. 
Frustrated agents consistently received such non-cooperation with 
46 their investigations. Everyone they encountered sympathized with 
the rebels, save the Mexican Federal agents. The Praeger Hardware 
Company, for example, made a practice of repacking ammunition in 
concealed packages and made deliveries to their customers in the 
middle of the night to further confound the efforts of the authorities.47 
Two other factors aided the smugglers' success. First, the 
Department of Justice agents along the border were woefully under­
staffed for the task ahead of them. The proliferation of arms traders 
along the entire rebel-held frontier frustrated the small staff assigned 
to stop smuggling. "We are so short of help" the agent in San Antonio 
lamented, "that it is next to impossible to keep up with all these 
1 4  
AG 
movements." In May 1913, one agent policed the region from Del 
Rio to Eagle Pass, two American towns directly opposite rebel-held 
territory. That agent considered the job to be "an utter impossibility." 
By the middle of 1913, one agent served in San Antonio with three 
others who had the responsibility to investigate smuggling along the 
50 border from Yuma, Arizona to Brownsville, Texas. It was not an 
ample staff for the work. 
The second factor helping rebel smuggling was their own network. 
By the end of April, the Constitutionalists—as the northern rebels, 
loosely united, were called—had already established juntas in 
American border towns at El Paso, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, Laredo, 
51 
and Brownsville, and further inland at San Antonio. These juntas, 
in addition to smuggling efforts, served as the centers for pro-rebel 
propaganda. Since the rebels controlled almost all of northern 
Mexico bordering the United States by the end of May 1913, with the 
• 
exception of Ciudad Juarez, they had a constant and direct funnel to 
52 American munitions. The substantial trade carried forth in these 
months naturally produced arrests but here too the rebels were 
fortunate. 
The high profits to be made, the proliferation of buyers and the 
friendliness of the public built a favorable climate for illegal trade, 
yet in spite of these conditions arrests were made. If smugglers had 
the misfortune to walk into the arms of United States Customs 
15  
officers or of agents of the Department of Justice with a load of guns 
and bullets, they still had little reason to fear severe penalties. 
Successful prosecution for violations of the embargo law proved 
highly unlikely. In the first place, as Bliss observed, even if 
apprehended and brought to trial, the rebels were guided by expert 
53 
legal counsel. The actions of courts, however, almost negated the 
need for any counsel at all. 
Two decisions by the Arizona District Court in March 1913 
pointed the way for future litigation against smugglers. These decisions 
in indictments filed against the Steinfeld Company of Tucson and the 
Phelps-Dodge Hardware Company of Tucson and Douglas effectively 
condoned smuggling in spite of the Proclamation of March 14,1912. 
These two companies dealt in huge supplies of rifles and cartridges 
which they ordered from east coast munitions firms. Federal District 
Attorneys brought charges against them for violation of the Proclama­
tion hoping to end wholesale shipments to the border. These hopes 
were not realized. 
The court found that since the defendants did not actually ship the 
munitions they sold but rather merely sold munitions to customers in 
the United States, they were not guilty. It was no violation of the 
law simply to order millions of rounds of ammunition. In addition, 
since no specific destination for the arms bound for Mexico could be 
proved, the court overturned the indictment. Charges, they affirmed, 
16  
had to denote specifically where the illegal shipments were bound. 
These decisions "permitted the shipment of large quantities of arms 
and ammunition to frontier towns, when the real destination was 
obviously Mexico, and then, in effect, forbade Federal officers to 
interfere with such goods until the final shipment into Mexico had 
54 
already begun." A smuggler would have to be caught in the act in 
order to be successfully prosecuted; even then, there was no guarantee 
that trial would convict the accused trafficker. In the Grand Jury 
investigation of twelve cases of suspected smugglers at Phoenix, all 
indictments were rejected. In an ironic twist, the Foreman of the 
Grand Jury, Tom Coleman, accused agents of the Mexican Govern­
ment of being at the root of all the trouble; he complained that they 
55 
harassed honest tradesmen. Although Coleman was known to have 
ties with rebel smugglers, this decision reflected the strongly 
56 
pro-rebel sentiment of the border. 
Thus, the border environs demonstratively offered a sound base 
of operations for smuggling. Despite the embargo on arms sales, the 
traffic in munitions continued, largely unaffected by the law. A pro-
rebel public, an inefficient and poorly staffed police force, a sympathetic 
court system, and an eager group of arms merchants combined to 
speed the delivery of weapons to Mexico. Department of Justice 
Agents estimated that 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition crossed the 
57 
border in the vicinity of Douglas, Arizona in 1913 alone. Two firms, 
17  
suspected by Department of Justice agents of being rebel suppliers— 
Krakauer, Zork, and Moye and Shelton-Payne Arms Company, both 
of El Paso—received a combined supply of more than 7,500,000 
58 
cartridges and 7,000 rifles from 1912 until the end of 1913. Through 
careful attention to his ordnance system, Villa assured himself of a 
large share of this trade as the revolution progressed. 
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CHAPTER II 
PANCHO VILL7\ IN 1913: 
FUNDING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Villa, like other budding revolutionaries, encountered various 
obstacles in outfitting and organizing his army for battle. Chief 
among his problems were the raising of revenue to purchase supplies 
and pay his troops and the building of public support, both at home 
and in the United States. Villa showed that he was resourceful and 
determined in his efforts to achieve these goals. 
Until his defeats at the battles of Celaya and Leon in the summer 
of 1915, Villa had no difficulty in recruiting men to join his army. 
Finding the money to pay for his army's needs proved more complex 
a challenge. Aside from the 10,000 peso-stipend he received from 
Madero at the close of his campaign against Diaz, Villa was not a 
rich manJ In all likelihood, Villa spent this money prior to Huerta's 
coup. One could speculate that Villa had accumulated some money from 
his career as an outlaw, though no evidence of this has come to light. 
At the outset of entry into Mexico, he received 1 ,500 pesos from Jose" 
Maria Maytorena and a loan from his brother—enough money to buy 
2 
horses and guns for his small band in the spring of 1913. 
24 
Villa relied on his skills as a bandit to gain the necessary money in 
the early stages of his campaign; his critics argued that he financed 
himself in this manner throughout the revolution. The New York Times 
reported that Villa robbed a train east of Chihuahua City in early 
3 April 1913 and took 75,000 dollars worth of silver bars. In a later 
story describing the same incident, the EI Paso Times placed the 
4 value of the stolen silver at 90,000 dollars. Since the El Paso 
Times had closer links to Villa's campaign, their estimate was 
probably more accurate. In any case, train robbery could not be 
depended upon as a constant source of revenue and Villa looked 
elsewhere. 
The sale and taxing of cattle made throughtout the revolution 
gave Villa a more consistent income. Shortly after making his train 
robbery, Villa confiscated a herd of cattle and drove them to 
5 
Columbus, New Mexico, where he sold them to Sam Ravel. Ravel 
played a role in Villa's much debated attack on Columbus in March 
6 
1916. Additional cattle-related funding probably came to Villa 
through the efforts of the Madero family—wealthy pro-revolutionary 
hacendados. Since the Maderos were longtime allies of Villa, it was 
safe to assume Villa received a part of the income from the sale of 
Madero family cattle arranged in March 1913. Raul Madero, later 
one of Villa's most trusted generals, traveled to Fort Worth, Texas, 
where he completed a large sale.7 
25 
Another possible source in the first months of Villa's campaign 
might have been pro-revolutionary sympathizers, both in the United 
States and in Mexico. The aid sent to Villa's soldiers by the people 
of El Paso following Villa's capture of Ciudad Juarez attested to the 
0 willingness of Americans to aid his movement. One known donation 
came to Villa's compatriot, Colonel Toribio Ortega, from a grateful 
El Paso citizen. The mother of Dr. Harle, whom Villa freed from 
prison where he had been held by Mexican Federals, appreciated the 
rebel actions. She sent 500 dollars to Ortega which he used to 
g 
purchase munitions. This example was probably not an isolated 
case, especially because of the great popular support Villa recieved. 
Contrary to the testimony of Henry Lane Wilson—who asserted 
that Villa plundered mines and estates of foreigners wherever he found 
them—Villa consistently abstained from this action, with the exception 
of the property of Spanish nationals and the Creel and Terrazas 
10 families. Villa's confiscations did increase beginning in the spring 
of 1915, but prior to that time foreign-held property in Mexico under 
Villa's control was relatively secure. Villa did rely on forced loans 
from banks, upper-class Mexicans, and Spanish nationals, however, 
1 1 
to derive income for his army. Because of his needs for munitions, 
he refrained from imposing these policies on Americans and their 
companies until after the American recognition of Venustiano Carranza 
in October 1915. 
26 
The documented funds Villa gathered throughout 1913 amounted 
to a considerable sum and, in part, explain the relative ease with 
which he supplied his growing army. In his first major victory, the 
capture of Torreon, Villa demonstrated his deference toward 
Americans and his general revenue^raising scheme which he followed 
through the revolution. Villa demanded a forced loan of 3,000,000 
pesos from the predominantly Spanish merchants and land owners of 
12 
that city, a demand which specifically exempted Americans. 
Writers disagreed over the exact sum Villa managed to extract from 
Torreon in his first visit in October 1913. Martin Luis Guzman 
13 
believed Villa took 300,000 pesos; Clendenen stated that Villa 
14 
received 300,000 dollars. This confusion resulted in part from 
the fact that Villa apparently demanded a specific loan from the banks 
of Torreon for 300,000 pesos. According to reports from John 
Silliman, American vice-consul at Veracruz,, Villa managed to 
collect most of his loans in any case, taking a total of 3,000,000 pesos 
1 from the city. At that time, two pesos equalled about one dollar. 
Before departing, Villa ordered that all cotton in the region be 
16 
harvested as it was property of the revolution. The Laguna district 
of Torreon produced almost all of Mexico's cotton and the estimated 
17 
value of the crop approached 20,000,000 dollars. Had he been able 
to convert all this cotton to cash, it certainly would have given him 
27 
ample funding for his army. However, because Villa's stay in 
Torreon was threatened by counterattack from advancing Federal 
troops, he remained there only a short time. His army was vulner­
able. He retreated northward two weeks after taking the city, leaving 
1 ft a small garrison behind. The Federals retook the city by early 
December. Even if Villa had succeeded in harvesting and shipping 
the crop, he had no direct route north toward the American border; 
the Federals still occupied Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez, key 
points on the railroad line. Without this link to the American market, 
it was not probable that Villa—at this time—exploited the Laguna cotton. 
Although accounts differed over the exact quantity of money 
Villa extracted from Torreon, they agreed on how he spent it. Villa 
dispatched his brother Hipolito and another trusted compatriot, 
Carlos Jauregui, with money to go to the border and buy arms. 
Jauregui had been helpful to Villa in his escape from prison and had 
joined Villa's original band crossing into Mexico from the United 
States. After a short squabble with General Tomas Urbina who 
attempted to pocket a portion of the loot for himself, Hipolito Villa 
and Jauregui took the money to the vicinity of Ojinaga where they 
19 transacted their business. Since no further record of their actions 
20 appeared, "one can surmise they were successful in their mission." 
With an army then numbering between 6,000 and 9,000 soldiers, 
Villa moved in early November against the remaining Federal 
21 opposition in Chihuahua State. After a three-day skirmish with the 
Federal garrison at Chihuahua City, Villa directed a lightning attack 
on Ciudad Juarez. The Federals assumed Villa had pulled back to the 
south, retreating from Chihuahua City to lick his wounds, but they 
erred in their perceptions. On the night of November 14-15, Villa 
led his army in a surprise storming of Juarez which resulted in quick 
victory. His army entered the town in trains which the Federals 
22 believed carried their own forces. His capture of Juarez brought 
him control of almost all of Chihuahua for it compelled the Federals 
at Chihuahua City to withdraw to safety at Ojinaga. By the beginning 
pq 
of January 1914, all of Chihuahua State belonged to Villa. ° 
Control of Juarez boosted Villa's financial stature. Three days 
after he entered the city—before he moved his troops south to meet 
the Federal counterattack at Tierra Blanca—he demanded and 
^ OA. received a forced loan of 100,000 dollars from two banks in Juarez. 
In addition, in his rapid capture of the city he had taken 500,000 dollars 
worth of clothing and other provisions from the stores of the Federal 
25 garrison. Having total authority in Chihuahua allowed Villa to draw 
from numerous sources to finance his affairs. He immediately 
imposed taxes on the cattle exported from Chihuahua to the United 
States. One of the larger ranches paid him nearly 25,000 dollars 
26 
duty in the months of November and December alone. Another cattle 
27 
company reportedly paid him 6,000 dollars in the same time. 
29 
Apparently, the ranchers had reached a working arrangement with 
Villa, for Bliss reported that they seemed satisfied with the Villa 
28 taxes. 
Other loot came to him while in Juarez. He collected 300,000 
pesos just after arrival from gambling hall revenues and more forced 
29 
loans on local banks. With a constant income assured from gambling 
halls, bordellos, duties on cattle, and his forced loans, Villa amassed 
30 
a tremendous war chest with which to outfit his army. 
In Chihuahua City, still more bounty awaited Villa. After the 
Federal soldiers fled, Villa entered Chihuahua City and decreed the 
outright confiscation of all property owned by Spanish nationals; at 
the same time he issued his own fiat currency and declared that it 
was the only legal tender for the regions he dominated. People were 
31 
ordered to exchange Mexican Federal money for Villist bills. Later 
that month Villa expanded his confiscations. He ordered that all lands 
and property belonging to the Creel and Terrazas families now 
32 belonged to the revolution. Because Terrazas and Creel owned the 
largest estates in Mexico and had vast cattle holdings, this act gave 
33 Villa access to 500,000 head plus banks, homes, and ranches. 
Still more income came to Villa. Having captured Luis Terrazas 
Jr., Villa forced him to reveal the location of 500,000 dollars of gold 
9 
which had been taken from the Banco Minero in Chihuahua City and 
34 hidden from the rebels before they advanced into town. Although 
30 
Guzman and Reed presented differing accounts of the seizure of this 
35 booty, they concurred that it totaled 500,000 dollars. Villa also 
took control of several mines when he decreed wholesale confiscations. 
The exact worth of this metal escaped tabulation; however, The New York 
Times reported in early February that Villa was "already in possession 
of much bullion." At that time he considered minting his own coins, 
though he never did. Mexicans, as most people in times of instability, 
tended to hoard gold and silver. Thus had he minted coins they would 
have simply been taken from circulation. In any event, having decided 
not to operate a mint, he used captured bullion to purchase goods in 
37 
El Paso. 
Thus, by early 1914, Villa had built a solid economic base from 
which to supply his forces. Estimates placed his accumulated wealth 
38 at 5,000,000 pesos. In addition to this cash, he had control over 
vast property and livestock. He had achieved a remarkable financial 
success, and with this money he built the most powerful army Mexico 
has seen. 
Throughout his rise to power in Chihuahua, Villa cultivated a 
positive public image; this image aided his recruiting efforts in drawing 
soldiers to his army but more importantly it helped to maintain his 
supply lines in the United States. Villa wished Americans to know that 
he professed nothing but friendship toward the United States. He did 
this in a variety of ways. In June 1913, he sent a note to the American 
31 
Consul at Ciudad Juarez warning him of a pending attack on that city. 
He expressed his anxiety for Americans in that city who might suffer 
39 injury when his army moved in. Although this might have been part 
of a plan to divert the attention of the Mexican Federal army from his 
real intentions, Villa knew the importance of American good will from 
the beginning. A month later Villa sent his troops to the relief of a 
band of American citizens at Madera who were menaced by outlaws.^ 
In August, Villa tracked down and executed the bandit "Mocho" Moreno 
41 
who was accused of murdering an American citizen in Chihuahua. 
He told the press he would come to the aid of any Americans who were 
42 
in the regions under his rule. The EI Paso Times gave front page 
coverage to these heroic pro-American acts undertaken by Villa, 
43 
which led to speculation that Villa bribed this paper. However, from 
May 1913 until early 1915, The New York Times also donated much 
44 space to pro-Villa stories. At any rate, Villa made certain that 
his pro-American deeds received attention. 
As Villa rose in military stature, he continued his deference 
toward Americans and American property in Mexico. Reports from 
Torreon in October 1913 confirmed Villa's good will. "General 
Villa," Consul Carothers said, "has shown himself very well disposed 
to Americans." Not only had he exempted Americans from his forced 
loans, but he had ordered troops to guard American businesses and 
had provided a special train for Americans who might wish to leave 
32 
45 -
the city. Immediately after taking Jtfarez, Villa ordered the execu­
tion of looters and forbade drinking; his ability to keep good order in 
Juarez impressed consul Edwards and relieved those citizens of 
El Paso who had feared worse.4® 
Villa hoped to make his actions clear and justifiable in the 
American public's mind. For every criticism leveled against him, 
Villa had a logical and immediate countercharge. Villa took bank 
funds, but he promised to repay the money when the revolution 
47 
triumphed. Villa confiscated the property of the Creel and 
Terrazas families, but he decreed that their estates would be divided 
4-R among the widows and orphans of the revolution. He responded to 
criticisms of his actions against the Spanish and wealthy Mexicans 
saying that these people had supported the tyrannical Huerta govern-
49 ment and had oppressed and abused the Mexican people for centuries. 
When the State Department made repeated protests against those 
seizures, Villa promised that former owners would be compensated for 
50 
their losses. Villa's actions convinced John Silliman—who had 
never met him—that Villa represented "the highest type of physical, 
51 
moral, and mental efficiency" possible in Mexico. 
Villa even tailored his campaigns in order to minimize danger 
to Americans, or so he wanted the United States to understand. "I 
have left my army twelve miles outside the city," Villa told reporters, 
"so that I can give protection to families living here and across the 
33 
52 
riven." At the same time, Villa expressed great regret over the 
* 53 lone American death resulting from his capture of Juarez. Perhaps 
the most heatedly debated aspect of Villa's behavior for Americans to 
understand was his treatment of prisoners. He had executed those he 
captured. Since the press made it clear that the Federals followed 
the same practice—and since as Villa explained, the men he put to 
death were "all more or less responsible for the murder of President 
* ^>4-Madero and Abraham Gonzalez—some of his critics were silenced. 
Taking Villa's side in the debate, an American journal wrote, "It is a 
sad thing, this death in warfare, but it is not the worst. The oppression 
55 of a people such as Mexico has long known is worse." Villa's 
agreement in January, after a conference with General Hugh Scott, 
effectively ended complaints; he promised to follow the rules of 
civilized warfare and thus further enhanced his image in the United 
56 
States. 
By early 1914, Villa seemed blessed. Victorious in battle, 
popular both at home and abroad, and well supplied with money, he 
seemed to be Mexico's hope for the future. By this time he had built 
a reliable supply network which effectively brought munitions to his 
army. 
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CHAPTER III 
FELIX SOMMERFELD AND FRIENDS 
The Movement of Weapons into Mexico 
Villa gathered munitions from the United States and Mexico, 
yet by late 1913, he had come to depend primarily on the United 
States. Villa's method of securing arms inside Mexico was simple 
and relatively easy to tally; he took munitions from the Federals in 
battles. In the early months, before his army swelled in numbers, 
this method provided critically needed weapons. The earliest 
reference to captured munitions appeared after the battle at Sart 
Andt^s, prior to Villa's Torreon victory. There, according to 
Guzman, Villa took 600 rifles, 150,000 cartridges, and several 
hundred hand grenades.1 Others reported that Villa also gained 
2 four field pieces and six machine guns from this engagement. Just 
after the battle, Fidel Avila brought 200,000 rounds of ammunition 
to Villa's troops. Avila, who would later serve in Villa's Chihuahua 
government, evidently smuggled the munitions across the border near 
3 Douglas, Arizona. 
Reports from Department of Justice agents confirmed that Villa 
had been successful in securing ammunition. They believed that his 
troops had a reserve supply of 150,000 cartridges and that his men 
39 
4 were well armed and well provisioned. The El Paso Times backed 
up these reports. It observed that Villa had "plenty of ammunition" 
5 
and that he also carried nine cannons with him. 
In Torreon, Villa found additional armaments. The New York 
Times said that he "captured practically all the Federal's arms and 
artillery."^ Other writers gave more specific totals. According 
to one, Villa took 13 cannon; 500,000 cartridges; 1,000 rifles; 6 
machine guns; 40 railroad engines; and a vast amount of rolling stock.7 
Guzman's account supported this, though he estimated that Villa 
g 
received only 300 rifles. In any case, Villa's army gained a large 
quantity of munitions at Torreon. He described this as a critical 
victory because "it supplied us with materials and enabled me to 
g 
prepare my forces for winning important towns." Consul Hamm 
sustained these reports of Villa's having secured supplies following 
his victory. Hamm informed the State Department that upon his 
departure from Torreon in mid-October Villa led 6,000 well-armed 
and well-supplied troops.^ 
When he took Juarez and won a quick victory over counter­
attacking Federals at Tierra Blanca, Villa again reaped stores of 
arms from the Federals. His takings here proved, however, to be 
less substantial than those from Torreon. The rebels harvested 
95,000 rounds of ammunition and two machine guns by storming 
Juarez. Ten days later, Villa boasted from Tierra Blanca that 
40 
"we have completely routed the enemy. We took all his artillery 
11 
and three trains. " Clearly then, as Villa came to dominate all of 
Chihuahua he successfully preyed on the battered troops of the 
Federal Army in order to equip his army. However, he knew he had 
to procure his munitions from other sources. One could not sustain 
an army by this method of foraging for munitions. Villa looked to the 
United States to fulfill that demand. Central to his system of finding 
arms through America was Felix Sommerfeld. 
In testimony given to Federal Agents in New York City on 
June 30, 1915, JoSe Vasconcelos, a minister of the Convention 
Government of Mexico, identified Sommerfeld as Villa's principle 
agent in the United States. Vasconcelos said that Sommerfeld had 
the responsibility of purchasing arms for Villa since mid-1915, and 
that Sommerfeld supported himself from commissions on his 
12 purchases. Information about Sommerfeld appeared earlier than 
Vasconcelos recalled, at least in terms of his involvement in Mexican 
revolutions. 
That involvement began before 1911 . Sommerfeld migrated 
to Mexico from Germany around 1900 after having served as a reserve 
officer in the Kaiser's Army. Among other vocations, he worked as a 
correspondent for the Associated Press for a short time.^® In a 
method that was not clear, Sommerfeld met Madero, who, when 
he became President of Mexico, appointed Sommerfeld as the head of 
41 
14 the Mexican Secret Service. Department of Justice agents believed 
that Sommerfeld's primary duties in the Madero administration entailed 
15 
undercover work in the southern part of the United States. 
The earliest specific mention of Sommerfeld cropped up in 
Department of Justice reports in May 1913. Sommerfeld, accompanied 
by Alberto Fuentes, the former governor of Aguascalientes, and 
Francisco Vasquez Gomez, a Madero revolutionary, traveled to 
Ciudad Porfirio Diaz. There they met with Venustiano Carranza, the 
16 
the titular leader of the rebel's Constitutionalist movement. The 
following day Sommerfeld returned to the United States "endowed 
with powers from Chief Carranza"—powers which presumably 
17 included munitions purchasing. Sommerfeld's trail for the next 
several weeks was roughly traceable due to the diligence of the Mexi­
can Federal agents. Their suspicions reaffirmed American agents' 
reports linking him to rebel arms smuggling. 
Department of Justice agents learned that Sommerfeld traveled 
to Washington in company with Vasquez Gomez on May 20, 1913 with 
18 
the express purpose of buying munitions. From Washington he made 
his way to New York City where he stayed at the Hotel Belmont on 
May 26th. At the same time Sommerfeld was in the city, the Madero 
brothers were also present. Raul and Julio Madero reportedly met 
with Clyde Sheehan and Francis Bannerman, two men who had been 
implicated in a large arms deal; they arranged for the pending 
42 
delivery of 50,000 Mauser rifles and thousands of cartridges to be 
sent to the rebels. This shipment had been purchased by Francisco 
Madero before Huerta took power. Agents believed that Sommerfeld 
played some part in this transaction. They also believed that the 
Madero brothers had come to New York City to meet with Sheehan 
and Bannerman for delivery of this shipment. In the same visit, 
Sommerfeld met with another munitions supplier, Ed Mauer, in 
18 order to buy ammunition. As events proved, Mexican agents had 
good cause to worry. 
Subsequent to the Madero brothers' and Sommerfeld's visits to 
New York, a large shipment of weapons left that city for New Orleans. 
Rumor held that this shipmentwas "part of a purchase made by Madero 
19 
about three years ago." Several field pieces; 150,000 cartridges, 
and 2 machine guns reportedly were on board. Thus, it was possible 
that arms originally purchased by Madero might have been funneled to 
Villa and Carranza. 
Sommerfeld's connection with the Madero family in arms traffick­
ing was supported by additional dispatches from Department of Justice 
agents in June and July 1913. "We have every reason to believe," 
they commented, "that the Maderos, while they are not actively 
engaged, are furnishing money to Carranza through Sommerfeld and 
20 
Juan Sanchez Azcona." Sommerfeld, the Madero brothers, and 
Juan Sarichez Azcona met in San Antonio in late June; by this time, 
43 
agents were regularly keeping eye on Sommerfeld's actions. "Felix 
Sommerfeld is with them as a sort of secretary and acts as an agent 
21 
between them and Carranza at Piedras Negras" the report said. 
Thus, it was clear that Sommerfeld had close ties with the Maderos, 
with Carranza, and with suspected arms dealers in the early summer 
of 1913. Sommerfeld's relationship to Villa seemed less certain. 
However, since the Madero family backed Villa, it was probable that 
Sommerfeld already knew him too. In addition, the testimony of 
Jose Vasconcelos, if accurate, established that Sommerfeld worked 
with Villa as early as June 1913. In addition, since the Constitutionalist 
movement led by Carranza included Villa's army under its banner, no 
conscious distinction would have been made between arms bound for 
Villa or Carranza in the reports of the Department of Justice agents. 
Therefore, arms for Villa might have simply been referred to as 
"Constitutionalist" or "rebel" shipments. It was equally possible that 
Villa and Carranza relied on identical smuggling systems at this stage 
of the revolution. 
Sommerfeld disappeared from the reports of Department of 
Justice agents for several months. The only reference to him prior to 
January 1914, appeared on December 15, 1913, when he left Juarez 
for Chihuahua City to confer with Villa, supposedly to discuss the 
22 treatment of foreigners in Villa's territory. Sommerfeld came to 
Juarez, if not with Villa, at least shortly thereafter. In an article in 
44 
Literary Digest describing conditions in Mexico under Villa's govern­
ment, Sommerfeld was reported to be a close and trusted advisor of 
23 
Villa, who had been with him just after Villa took the city. If this 
story was true, Sommerfeld had Villa's trust as early as November 
1913 .  
In early January, Sommerfeld's name surfaced in Department of 
Justice reports; at this time, he was reported to be moving between 
El Paso and Marfa, Texas. With Sommerfeld were H.A. Thompson 
and another man referred to as "Remus;" both men were later identi­
fied as arms smugglers. Oddly enough, Thompson had served as some 
24 
sort of a Federal officer before he began dealings with Sommerfeld. 
After this time, a curious change appeared in the reports of American 
agents. Sommerfeld returned to El Paso on January 15. He then 
directed the attention of United States Customs officials to various 
clandestine plots of the Mexican Federal officers. By this time, 
neither the rebels nor the Mexican Federal Government had the legal 
right to import munitions. In late July, Wilson had ordered that no 
munitions cross the border. The Mexican Federal Government 
operatives attempted to pass ammunitions and arms across the border 
despite the embargo, just as had the rebels. Sommerfeld informed 
American agents that the Federals planned to send munitions to their 
beseiged garrison at Ojinaga.^ He later advised American officers 
that the Federals had concealed munitions stored in the Union Depot at 
45 
El Paso. He told the Americans that he acted on a tip from Mr. E. 
Hughes, the head clerk at the Shelton-Payne Arms Company. Hughes 
may have had more interest in aiding the rebel faction than in aiding 
the Federals; the well-endowed rebels were far better customers than 
the increasingly hard-pressed Federals. Sommerfeld advised 
American agents that the clever Federals had disguised their munitions 
26 
which they soon would spirit to Ojinaga. Searches discovered no 
such ammunition. Later that month Department of Justice agents 
were pleased to report that Sommerfeld had volunteered to infiltrate 
the Mexican Federal junta in El Paso in order to inform American 
27 
officers of illicit arms trafficking. 
These reports revealed a number of possible changes in the 
illicit border arms trading and a certain alteration of Sommerfeld's 
role. A man who had once been considered a criminal now worked in 
conjunction with American officers charged with preventing smuggling. 
This information reconfirmed the suspicions of the Mexican Federal 
Government which had long believed that American law officers worked 
28 
hand in hand with the rebels. These reports also attested to the 
intelligence and, perhaps, cleverness of Sommerfeld. By directing 
the attention of American officers toward the Huerta smugglers, he 
diverted them from acting against the rebels. That the Custom 
Officers and Department of Justice agents cooperated with Sommerfeld— 
a known rebel smuggler—might have simply been interpreted as great 
46 
cleverness by Sommerfeld and a decided lack of the same by American 
agents. 
However, Sommerfeld's ability to gain the confidence of the 
American agents probably resulted more from the conditions along the 
border in January 1914, than it did from the gullible character of 
American officers. Efforts to curtail rebel smuggling took place amid 
a decidedly hostile environment for American operatives charged with 
this duty. Understaffed and overmatched by the sheer volume of the 
illegal arms trade, agents drew the wrath of most El Paso residents 
29 
from the start of the revolution. Agents undoubtedly knew the 
rumors, abundant in mid-January, that the President planned to 
30 
rescind the embargo and open the border to unlimited arms trade. 
Believing that the best of their efforts to stop smugglers were probably 
for naught with the impending suspension of the embargo, agents may 
have been more willing to direct their actions against the Federal 
smugglers than the more popular rebel faction. There was the added 
chance that Sommerfeld intended to exhaust the energy of the American 
operatives. The numbers of false leads given to the Americans by 
opposing sides in the smuggling community undeniably reduced the 
zeal they had to catch smugglers. Whether done consciously or not, 
these unsubstantiated tips aided smuggling. 
Between the outset of his campaign against Huerta and his capture 
of Jijarez, Villa probably relied more on captured munitions from his 
47 
battles than on smuggling. After the capture of Juarez, having direct 
access to American suppliers, he depended on the United States to 
fill his needs. He did engage in smuggling from the beginning, though 
the quantities he received prior to taking Juarez did not match those he 
received afterwards. In June and July Villa based his army around 
Ascencion where he awaited the arrival of munitions from the United 
31 
States. According to Clendeneh, Villa had already established his 
32 
smuggling operations at El Paso prior to departing for war. Whether 
Sommerfeld played a role in the operation at this time was not dis­
covered. Most evidence suggested that Villa received munitions from 
the United States in these months. The El Paso Times reported that 
33 
200,000 cartridges crossed the border near that town in late June. 
Since the Mexican Federals still had the privilege of importing any 
munitions they requested, it was obvious that this shipment went to the 
rebels. Villa commanded the strongest rebel force outside of Juarez. 
Further evidence suggesting that Villa armed his troops through 
American sources came from Consul Edwards in Ciudad Juarez who 
reported in early July that "Villa and Ortega are said to have money 
34 
and are paying for what they get." Since these reports predated the 
first reported successes Villa had in taking armaments from Federal 
troops in battle, it seemed obvious he secured arms from America. 
Villa evidently did not get all he paid for. On July 16, 1913, 
Federal agents seized a large shipment of ammunition believed to be 
48 
35 
destined for Villa. The 448,000 cartridges, valued at 20,000 dollars 
had been hidden underneath mounds of coal in boxcars at an El Paso 
railroad yard. Federal agents were not always so lucky. At the 
same time this ammunition was discovered, Colonel Ortega, Villa's 
37 subordinate, smuggled 90,000 rounds across the border near El Paso. 
Since Villa had netted from 75,000 dollars to 90,000 dollars from his 
train robbery in April, the money could have purchased almost 
1 ,000,000 cartridges. 
Villa and Ortega had forged a strong friendship by this time and 
they operated in the same regions. It was sensible to assume that they 
shared the same smuggling operation. Ortega served loyally with 
the Division of the North until his death in combat in the summer of 
38 
1914. Department of Justice reports linkedOrtega to smuggling 
39 forays in early June 1913 and throughout that summer. In August, 
they reported Ortega smuggled another 40,000 rounds across the 
border near Fabens, Texas, a favorite location for clandestine opera-
40 
tions. Villa probably shared in Ortega's supplies. 
Villa accumulated sufficient ammunition while in Ascensfon to 
* 
enable him to rout the Federals at San Andres in August. This 
41 
victory, as noted earlier, brought him additional munitions. Further 
evidence linking Villa to smuggling came from Tasker H. Bliss; he 
reported that in the weeks when Villa had gone south to take Torreon, 
42 
there had been a marked decline in smuggling near El Paso. 
49 
Any doubts about the efficiency of Villa's supply system dis­
appeared following his capture of Jdarez. Plentiful munitions were 
just across the river. Of the four major arms dealers along the 
border, two maintained headquarters in the city of El Paso. These 
two firms, Shelton-Payne Arms Company and Krakauer, Zork, and 
Moye, along with the Steinfeld Company of San Antonio and Phelps-
Dodge Hardware Company of Arizona, imported the bulk of border 
armaments. From March 1912 until mid-December 1913—a time in 
which no munitions could legally be taken into Mexico by the rebels— 
these companies received a total of more than 7,000 rifles and 
43 
7,500,000 cartridges. Thus in taking Juarez, Villa seated himself 
at the center of arms trading. 
Tasker H. Bliss anticipated that smuggling would balloon when 
Villa arrived; he doubled his regular patrols along the border in the 
44 
vicinity of El Paso. Villa's immediate need for ammunition after his 
victory at Juarez has been debated, but in all probability he had scant 
stores upon his arrival. Bliss' precautions, therefore, seemed quite 
sensible. Villa announced he found what he came to Juarez for by 
45 
seizing 95,000 rounds from the Federal garrison. Yet, 95,000 
rounds would hardly have been enough for the requirements of a 6,000-
man army. This statement may have been given not as a gauge of his 
strength, but ratherto impress the Mexican Federal army and to 
reduce the diligent efforts by American officials to halt smuggling. 
50 
After several days of battling around Chihuahua and in the actual taking 
of the Juarez garrison, Villa's troops had undoubtedly spent much of 
the ammunition they gained from taking Torreon. Ten days after 
c 45 arriving in Juarez, Villa was reported to be short of ammunition. 
John Reed described Villa's army upon arrival in Juarez as being 
47 
"almost armless," though he may have overstated the case. By 
November 26, Villa had enough munitions to defeat the Federal army 
at Tierra Blanca. 
Munitions awaited buyers in El Paso when Villa took Juarez. 
In early November, Krakauer, Zork, and Moye had 446,000 rounds and 
48 
100 carbines in their warehouses. It was possible Villa took advan­
tage of this situation prior to departing to face the Federals, though 
smuggling undoubtedly continued in his absence under the direction of 
49 
General Juan S. Medina who garrisoned the city. After Villa returned 
„ 50 
from Tierra Blanca, a river of weapons came to Juarez. 
Sommerfeld made his base in El Paso at this time and may have 
influenced the increase in smuggling. Subsequent to the capture of 
Ciudad Juarez, Villa paid him two-hundred thousand dollars in the 
51 
space of three weeks. Villa's brother, Hipolito, received similar 
52 ^ 
payments during this same time.. Hipolito may already have converted 
the money from the Torreon campaign into weapons and, knowing Villa's 
plans in advance, ordered them delivered to El Paso. The smuggling 
51 
evidently worked well. Bliss observed in mid-December that most of 
53 
Villa's troops carried new model carbines. 
Federal agents who experienced frustration in the past now faced 
sterner challenges. A flourishing arms trade began in the grocery 
stores, the pawn shops, and second-hand merchants of El Paso. These 
dealers greatly complicated the duties of Americans, who had an 
impossible task before the advent of Villa. Reports of smuggling and 
suspected smuggling poured out of El Paso. Agents learned that 
95,000 rounds crossed the border near Fabens, Texas in late November; 
another 24,000 rounds came to Juarez in early December. Agents 
were certain that the vast bulk of illegal shipments escaped detection, 
55 
despite their best efforts. The arrest of a few dozen smugglers— 
each having several thousand rounds or a dozen rifles—did little to 
56 
stem the tide. As a further blow to the American operatives, just 
at the time Villa stepped up smuggling efforts, the Federal Grand 
57 
Jury rejected indictments made against a dozen noted smugglers. 
By the end of January, Villa's position had markedly improved. Over 
the next several months his control of Chihuahua and the actions of 
the United States government would make him even more of a force in 
Mexico. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE OPEN BORDER AND VERACRUZ 
The Relationship Between Villa's Diplomacy and Arms Imports 
1 "Villa is Jubliant," the headline read. On February 3, 1914, 
President Wilson removed the embargo on munitions bound for Mexico. 
Villa had every reason to be ecstatic. He telegraphed his response to 
The New York Times lauding the justice of President Wilson's decision 
and promising the prompt pacification of Mexico. The paper printed it 
2 on the front page. The paper also reported that Villa would delay his 
campaign against the Federals at Torreon in order to amass more 
3 
munitions now that all import restrictions had been lifted. Although 
El Paso arms dealers reportedly lacked ammunition and rifles in the 
4 first few weeks after the embargo ended, that situation changed rapidly. 
Indeed, if this report told the story accurately, it tended to support the 
efficiency of Villa's smuggling operations up to the end of the embargo. 
In the first several days after the President's announcement, only 
- 5 
37,000 rounds crossed the border from El Paso to Juarez. According 
to this story, there were no other munitions in El Paso at this time.^ 
However, Shelton-Payne Arms Company and Krakauer, Zork, and Moye 
had regularly received shipments of weapons prior to this time; from 
December 26, 1913 to January 30, 1914, Shelton-Payne had been sent 
at least 200,000 rounds while 1 ,000,000 rounds came to Krakauer, 
Zork, and Moye.7 
Villa obviously had succeeded in circumventing the embargo but 
this success paled in comparison to the arms which he imported after 
February3, 1914. As The New York Times suspected, Villa's delay 
in attacking Torreon resulted in part from his desire to exploit this 
newly available source of arms. This he did. Curiously, in the same 
story, reporters had learned that Francis Bannerman, a New York 
City arms dealer who had traded with the Madero family and Sommei— 
feld, opposed the lifting of the embargo. He argued that this act would 
not bring peace to Mexico, but it was also probable that he resented 
the increased competition from other arms merchants which would 
8 
result from open trade. 
By March 20, 1914, seven weeks after the lifting of the embargo, 
2,900,000 cartridges had passed from El Paso to Juarez. Seven 
million more cartridges and 10,000 rifles had also been ordered and 
9 
were bound for El Paso for the rebels. Thereafter trade increased. 
By late April when the border closed again in wake of the Marine 
landing at Veracruz, Villa had received 6,800,000 rounds of ammuni­
tion.^ Just before the reimposition of the embargo, 2,500 carbines 
also crossed into Juarez from El Paso.^ 
Finances occupied Villa's attention as well during the months of 
early 1914. Blessed with a strong treasury by mid-January, he 
58 
realized that with a growing army and with difficult battles ahead, he 
would have to find additional ways to pay for his campaigns. The 
mines of Chihuahua were one additional source Villa tapped in late 
January. He met with the owners of the mining and smelting 
12 companies of Chihuahua on January 23, 1914. A week later he and 
the mine operators reached an agreement whereby Villa's government 
13 
received 10 percent of mining profits. The American Smelting and 
Refining Company, owned by the Guggenheim family, was the largest 
firm in Chihuahua. Villa may have gained additional payments beyond 
the 10 percent tax on profits, although rumors of Guggenheim payoffs 
14 have never been proven. The company had suspended production for 
a time but Villa gave them assurances that he would make conditions 
15 
safe for their operation. 
Villa's second capture of Torreon in April 1914 gave him even 
greater wealth; there he achieved the high water mark of his financial 
security. Torreon was the center for Mexico's Laguna cotton district 
and Villa meant to have it for himself. Immediately after taking the 
16 
city, Villa ordered the exile of all Spanish nationals. Villa's 
expulsion of the Spaniards, who owned the majority of cotton production, 
may have been prompted by a desire to keep them from interfering with 
subsequent confiscation of their property. In any case, confiscation and 
expulsion complemented each other as policies bringing income to Villa. 
59 
Estimates varied as to the exact value Villa derived from these 
actions. Certainly, it was substantial. Prior to his seizures at 
Torr?on, Villa had amassed approximately 15,000,000 dollars of 
property.^7 Torreon brought him much more. Cotton confiscated from 
^ 'j 0 
Torreon arrived in Juarez three days after Villa took that city. Con­
sul Hamm informed the State Department that most of the cotton crop 
19 
had already been seized and was in transit to the American border. 
The destination of the cotton and other confiscated products was El 
Paso. Consul George Carothers, who had been assigned to accompany 
Villa by the Secretary of State, reported that Villa shipped cotton, 
bullion, and other products to Juarez, where they were sold through 
El Paso dealers. Carothers observed that the sales were arranged 
by Villa's own agents, independent of Constitutionalist leader Carranza 
20 
and brought arms and ammunition solely to Villa's army. Seventy 
21 
carloads of cotton had been shipped to El Paso for sale by April 16. 
& 22 
The total crop Villa confiscated at Torreon was 100,000 bales. 
Domination of the city also gave him control over the highly productive 
23 mines in the immediate vicinity. 
His ordnance system functioned smoothly for products other than 
munitions required by Villa's army. By late April his army grew 
to 20,000 men and observers noted his soldiers were well armed, well 
24 
clothed and had the most modern equipment. Uniforms for his troops 
came to Villa from the Hayman Krupp Company of El Paso; Department 
60 
of Justice agents suspected that 10,000 uniforms went to the rebels in 
25 
late January. In his memoirs, Villa recalled that the firm's 
manager, Victor Carusoe, supplied him with everything he needed and 
26 
extended him credit whenever he needed it. Carusoe, who later 
admitted to making much profit from his dealings with the rebels, sued 
the Villa supply agency in December 1915 in order to recover money 
27 
due him. Evidently, he had extended Villa too much credit. 
Villa's capture of Torreon brought him some additional military 
stores from Federal Army supplies, but the exact quantity was disputed. 
The New York Times reported that four large guns, 1 ,000 rounds of 
28 shrapnel, and "thousands of rifles" fell to Villa's army. Other 
sources mentioned the capture of large quantities of ammunition, 
although Carothers believed that the retreating Federals blew up most 
29 
of it. Yet from the duration and severity of the battle, Villa had 
30 
definitely expended more munitions than he captured. 
Subsequent to the battle of Torrlon, Sommerfeld received first 
mention in Guzrnan's biography of Villa. Villa identified him as a 
German Jew, who, because of his abiding faith in Madero, had been 
placed in charge of buying munitions for Villa's troops. He was able 
and loyal, Villa recalled, and "he always delivered arms and ammuni-
31 
tion on time and in good condition." Consul Letcher reported later 
that Sommerfeld was "a henchman of the Maderos" and Villa's chief 
arms purchaser. According to Letcher, Villa gave Sommerfeld the 
61 
dynamite concession for the State of Chihuahua as reward for his 
30 
services, from which Sommerfeld derived a substantial income. 
Because Letcher had come to despise Villa by this time—calling him 
"promiscuous" and saying that, "his coarse, thick-lipped mouth" 
suggested "an admixture of Negro blood"—the accuracy of his informa-
33 
tion may have been suspect. 
Because Department of Justice agents' reports became less 
complete following the suspension of the embargo, Sommerfeld's 
activities in the early months of 1914 could only be roughly detailed. 
However, one important link in the Villa supply network surfaced in 
these months. American agents believed that by late February, 
Sommerfeld had collaborated with Sam Dreben, a man long suspected 
34 
of illegal arms trading. Sam Dreben first appeared in Mexico 
during the Madero revolt against Diaz. At the battle for Jtfarez, 
where Villa's troops fought, Sam Dreben—an American identified 
35 
as "The Fighting Jew"—served in the rebel army. Thus it was 
possible that Villa had met Dreben as early as December 1910. 
Dreben appeared in several reports from Department of Justice 
agents in 1913. In November of that year he visited the A. Baldwin 
Company in New Orleans where he attempted to buy part of the huge 
stock of munitions that company had on hand. In exchange for these 
36 
weapons, Dreben offered revolutionary bonds. For several weeks 
prior to and after this time, the A. Baldwin Company and the 
62 
Stauffei—Eshleman Company had been under surveillance by Ameri­
can operatives; these firms had been importing large quantities of 
37 munitions from Remington and Winchester through New York City. 
In mid-December, 4,500,000 rounds were in the Stauffer-Eshleman 
warehouses. 
Dreben had ties to another mysterious smuggling figure, T.N. 
Solomon. American agents believed that Dreben and Solomon—who 
later served as a cotton broker for Villa's agency in El Paso—organized 
two shipments of munitions through New Orleans—one on January 9, 
39 
1914 and another later that month. By late February, Solomon was 
reported to be conducting arms purchases for the rebels, moving 
40 
between New York and New Orleans in his business. 
From January through the winter and spring of 1914, Villa 
worked on his public relations with the American press and govern­
ment. As Nancy Brandt wrote, "He was vain enough to enjoy the 
attention that they (reporters) gave him and modern enough to realize 
41 the value of a good public image." To enhance the coverage his 
campaigns received, Villa permitted ten photographers and journalists 
to journey with him on his personal train during the Torreon attack 
42 
and after. He kept repeating his justification for seizing Spanish 
property—because criticism arose again with his capture of Torreon— 
stressing that Spanish had oppressed the Mexicans and, therefore, 
43 
merited the treatment they received. He argued that if he had not 
63 
44 
exiled them, the Mexican people would have killed them. As 
mentioned before, Villa's division of captured Spanish lands among 
the widows and orphans of the revolution did much to aid his Ameri-
45 
can image. 
While justifying his property seizures, Villa consistently bent 
to the urging of the American State Department. This flexibility 
by Villa made him appear more worthy of American support. He met 
with General Hugh Scott and agreed to follow the rules of civilized 
warfare; instead of executing his prisioners, he promised simply to 
46 
keep them captive. In early February, Villa dispatched troops to 
hunt down the guerrilla raider Maximo Castillo, who had attacked a 
train in Chihuahua and killed several Americans in the process; 
47 
reportedly, Villa was "outraged" at this incident. Villa repeatedly 
assured the State Department he would respect the lives and property 
of all foreigners in regions under his control; he seized the Spanish 
48 
property because he had proof that they aided and plotted with Huerta. 
Carothers reassured the State Department that Villa's bombastic 
statements threatening to kill all the Spanish in Torreon were simply 
intended to frighten them from helping the Federal army defend the 
city. Carothers promised no massacre of the Spanish and none took 
49 
place. Villa even agreed to American suggestions that a neutral 




The goal of Villa's conscious behavior toward Americans and 
American desires in Mexico seemed obvious; he needed access to 
border supplies. Although his campaign to keep his image polished 
did not always succeed—as shown in the Benton murder—he 
received generally favorable press coverage until his defeats at 
^ 51 
Celaya and Leon in April and June of 1915. To further promote his 
public relations, he printed his own newspaper in April 1914. Vida 
Nueva reflected Villa's decidedly pro-American pretensions while 
serving to counter Carranza's papers in the battle to gain mass support 
in Mexico. That paper's editorial policy contrasted sharply with 
Carranza papers, which tended to be hostile to American actions in 
52 
Mexico. 
The connection between Villa's public relations program and his 
need for munitions came sharply into fucus when the American Marines 
landed at Veracruz. This action threatened Villa in several ways. 
The seized cotton from Torreon had not yet been sold, and part of the 
crop had been temporarily impounded by a court injunction brought 
53 
by former owners. In addition, more than 2,500,000 rounds were 
bound for El Paso (having been purchased by his agents) just at the 
time of the invasion; another 350,000 cartridges were in El Paso on 
54 
the day that the border closed to munitions traffic. By this time, 
Villa doubted that he could rely on Carranza or Pablo Gonzalez—whose 
rebel army threatened to take Tampico—to help him get arms. This 
65 
knowledge made it all the more important that his American sources 
be protected. Thus, he faced the imperative task of securing muni­
tions as fast as possible before the embargo was reimposed. Villa 
understood that the crisis between Wilson and Huerta,which had begun 
on April 10th, threatened to bring war between the United States and 
55 
Mexico with the certain closure of the border to follow. His supply 
agents realized this too. On April 20, 1914, the rebels in El Paso 
^ 56 were sending all available munitions to Juarez at a feverish pace. 
These efforts paid off, as noted earlier, in the crossing of 2,500 
57 
rifles on April 20, three days ahead of the renewed embargo. Just 
ahead of the official closing of El Paso on April 24, 1914, 1 ,000,000 
^ 58 
rounds crossed into Juarez. From Chihuahua, Villa hurried to 
the border expressing hope that the boundary would not be closed 
while at the same time reminding the American government of his 
59 
need for ammunition to carry on his war against Huerta. 
Villa followed a conciliatory policy toward the United States 
following the renewal of the embargo; he stressed two themes. He 
consistently affirmed his friendship for the United States while 
reminding the State Department and the American press of his needs 
for American munitions to carry on the fight. In this second part of 
his response, he noted many times his justice toward foreigners and 
60 
the order and stability he promoted in regions under his control. 
His attitude did not succeed in opening the border immediately but it 
66 
did endear him in the hearts of Americans who expected that Villa 
would mount his army to attack the United States. When he came to 
Juarez from Chihuahua, he assured the Americans of his steadfast 
f r i e n d s h i p C a l l i n g  H u e r t a  a  d r u n k a r d ,  V i l l a  p r o m i s e d  A m e r i c a n s  
62 
he would not be drawn into war against them. Although Johnson 
believed Villa's attitude toward the American invasion stemmed from 
a desire to embarrass Carranza—who had reacted to the Americans 
with much more hostility than anticipated by the United States—the 
63 
determining factor appeared to be Villa's need for munitions. 
64 Grieb supported this analysis. 
As a reflection of Villa's attitude, Vida Nueva portrayed the 
invasion as resulting from Huerta's unjustified provocation. Its 
articles emphasized that Mexicans must not be deceived into making 
a false alliance against the United States because this would play into 
65 
Huerta's plot to save himself. 
Villa's responses worked to his favor, at least in the United 
States. American journalists pointed out that Villa, with an army 
estimated at 50,000 men, could easily have rallied the Mexicans to 
attack the United States. Because of his strong will and friendship 
66 
for America, he averted the crisis. Americans felt gratitude for 
67 
Villa's action and credited him with preventing war. This deed did 
not bring Villa the reward of an immediately opened border, but it 
assured him of favorable American actions in the future. 
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CHAPTER V 
BUILDING THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH 
Stockpiling for the New Revolution 
The renewed embargo complicated Villa's ordnance system, 
yet it by no means strangled it. The closed border may have caused 
Villa to alter his lines of supply in order to be assured of munitions. 
Until the renewed embargo, Villa relied primarily on munitions 
shipped to El Paso; before February 3, 1914, agents smuggled them 
to Juarez; after that time, they came to Villa through legal means. 
Arms did continue to flow to El Paso after April 23, 1914 in the 
fairly certain confidence of circumventing law enforcement efforts— 
a method which had proved effective in past months. Despite the 
embargo, 5,000,000 rounds came to El Paso by May 10.^ Still, arms 
in that city or anywhere along the American border were vulnerable 
to seizure by American authorities. That vulnerability may have 
contributed to Villa's decision to import arms through Tampico. 
Whether this decision belonged to Villa or to Sommerfeld was 
unclear; it was a calculated risk which both men were aware might 
backfire. Tampico fell to the rebel army of Pablo Gonzalez in mid-
2 May and subsequently became the center for large munition imports. 
Villa had met with Gonzalez in late May at Saltillo where according to 
73 
most accounts, the two men amicably discussed the future course of 
3 revolutionary action. By this time though, Villa and Carranza 
quarrelled violently over numerous issues and threatened to begin an 
all-out war against each other. Both men desired to lead the revolu-
tion. Since Gonzalez served Carranza loyally, and since Gonzalez's 
army held Tampico, any shipments for Villa going to that port were 
subject to seizure on Carranza's order. The American border 
presented risks as well and Villa may have felt he could influence 
Gonzalez to cooperate. Villa did buy arms which were sent to 
Tampico. He had ample funds and he had the hope that Gon^ctlez 
would allow him to receive his munitions. Additionally, since the 
American State Department urged Villa to reconcile his disputes 
with Carranza for revolutionary unity, Villa may have imagined some 
amicable arrangement would be reached. If so, he miscalculated. 
Villa accumulated ammunition and arms through his victories 
at Saltillo in mid-May and at Zacatecas in June. At Saltillo, he 
gained ten pieces of artillery and an undetermined quantity of 
5 cartridges from the fleeing Federals. Prior to his attack on 
Zacatecas, Villa boasted that his army was 20,000 men strong and 
6 well supplied with weapons—having 6,000,000 rounds in reserve. 
After taking Zacatecas, he claimed that he had found large stocks of 
ammunition left by the retreating army.7 Carothers confirmed this 
pat revolutionary boast, noting that Villa had taken 12,000 rifles in 
74 
capturing Zacatecas, although The New York Times set the figure at 
6,000.8  
Villa also continued to smuggle munitions through the port of 
El Paso. In the wake of the Marine landing at Veracruz and the 
subsequent mediation conference at Niagara Falls, the border had, 
of course, been officially closed. Yet, munitions shipments to El 
Paso through the spring and summer of 1914 showed not a decrease 
but an increase over past months. High volume smuggling continued 
as it had in the past. The Huerta government protested, but the 
United States maintained that such shipments had been outlawed. 
g 
Therefore, such protests were unfounded. Yet in light of conditions 
along the border, these complaints were highly justified. The New 
York Times noted that an entire trainload of munitions which had 
been amassed in May and June left from Juarez for Chihuahua on 
10 
June 30, 1914. 
American policy, in effect, ignored rebel smugglers. In 
reporting on the rumored passage of 200,000 rounds from El Paso to 
Juarez in early July, agents of the Department of Justice affirmed 
that the rumor was probably true; conditions along the border were 
such that "the practice of running contraband cannot be stopped without 
the assistance of the law. Law enforcement agents experienced 
some confusion because the President had not ordered the embargo to 
be enforced under the Congressional Resolution of March 14, 1912; 
75 
orders from the War Department had merely required that munitions 
be prevented from entering Mexico. Authorities could confiscate 
smuggler's munitions, but they had no power to arrest the smugglers 
themselves; the munitions were illegal but the act of smuggling was 
12 
not. While seemingly keeping to an attitude of neutrality toward 
the conflict in Mexico in order to placate the Huerta government 
negotiators at Niagara Falls, Wilson's refusal to implement the 
official embargo worked to the advantage of the rebels, particularly 
to Villa. Collector Zach L. Cobb lamented the scandalous level of 
smuggling and protested that he was unable to curtail arms traffic 
13 without the legal assistance of the embargo. Bliss complained that 
14 
the smugglers laughed at his men. Border restrictions, then, 
placed only minor obstacles in the way of arms trading. 
Reports from the border over the spring and summer confirmed 
this. Bliss estimated that at least 150,000 rounds of ammunition 
flowed from the vicinity of El Paso to Juarez each week. He stated 
that he would not have been surprised if the actual level of smuggling 
15 had been six times greater than that. Villa himself journeyed to 
Juarez several times with the express purpose of supervising this 
t r a d e . ^  ®  
With the opening of Tampico, another possible route for import­
ing arms became available, and Villa hoped to exploit it. His gambling 
on Gonzalez may have worked against him. By mid June, Villa 
76 
complained to agent Carothers that Carranza had impounded a ship­
ment of arms which he had personally paid for.^7 At this time, the 
Carranza-Villa dispute for revolutionary domination had reached 
volatile levels. Carranza ordered that Villa's army be denied coal 
from the Sabinas fields of Coahuila in addition to his command that 
ammunition at Tampico be kept from Villa.18 In the meantime, 
prior to this wide-open rupture between Villa and Carranza, Sommer-
feld had traveled to Washington, D.C. and New York, shortly after 
the fall of Tampico, to secure munitions for Villa. According to 
19 
The New York Times, those munitions had been sent to Tampico. 
Villa complained bitterly about this action by Carranza and essentially 
threatened to suspend operations against Huerta until he received his 
20 ammunition and coal. Cumberland noted that this was what Villa 
21  
actually did. 
Villa's anger was justified. The exact quantity of Villa's ship­
ments to Tampico remained in doubt, but it was certain they were 
large. Shipments directly from New York to Tampico began on 
June 3, 1914 with the departure of the Antilla with a cargo of 
22 3,000,000 rounds. Although the American government thereafter 
officially forbade munitions shipments from American ports to 
Mexican ports—as a way of maintaining the guise of impartiality for 
the Niagara conference—the United States in effect condoned these 
23 shipments. William F. Buckley, who served as one of the United 
States delegates to the Niagara Falls Conference, lamented this 
subterfuge. He pointed out that the shipment of arms from American 
ports to Mexican ports continued in spite of the embargo through a 
simple device. Munitions were shipped from New York to Galveston, 
Texas. Thereafter, vessels took the munitions to Tampico. In order 
to stay within the limits of the law, vessels leaving Galveston signed 
shipping papers which affirmed their destinations to be Havana. Their 
obvious port of call was Tampico. Buckley testified that at least six 
separate voyages from Galveston to Tampico took place in early June. 
Buckley further pointed out that Secretary of State Bryan had approved 
24 
of this scheme. 
Villa's share in these shipments must have been substantial. 
The bitterness he expressed at Carranza's withholding ammunition 
from him hinted at the size of Villa's orders. More concrete evidence 
appeared in The New York Times which identified the Antilla munition 
25 
held by Carranza as belonging to Villa. Records indicated that the 
vast bulk of munitions shipped to Tampico over these months originated 
in New York City with Flint and Company. In his testimony before the 
Fall Committee in 1919, Sherburne G. Hopkins, an agent for Carranza, 
identified Charles R. Flint as a well-known New York City banker and 
merchant. In 1911 , Hopkins approached Flint with hopes of securing 
26 a loan for the Madero government. Since Carranza controlled 
Tampico, it was clear that at least a part of the munitions sent there 
78 
were intended for his troops. As an agent for Carranza and an 
acquaintance of Flint, Hopkins may have been involved in these ship­
ments. Yet there was other evidence which linked Villa to Flint. 
Collector Cobb reported in late August that Villa had purchased 
5,000,000 rounds from Charles R. Flint, Company and that 2,000,000 
rounds had already arrived in El Paso from the same source.^ In 
addition, another of Villa's armament agents, Lazaro De La Garza— 
who had been in Washington, D.C. with Sommerfeld to negotiate arms 
purchases in late June 1914—had direct ties to Flint. Collector Cobb 
reported in September that De La Garza left Mexico to take up head­
quarters in New York City: "His address will be care of Flint and 
Company," Cobb noted. "You will have to judge as to the significance 
of this. 
On June 4th, the Antilla sailed from New York for Tampico, 
leaving just before the imposition of the marine embargo. Carothers 
also identified this shipment as having been purchased by Villa.^9 
Agents of the Department of Justice believed that the ship carried only 
on 
2,000,000 rounds and not 3,000,000 as previously thought. After 
the ammunition arrived and in spite of Carranza's orders, Villa had 
received this shipment through the efforts of Colonel E. Santos Coy 
0 "j 
who took it from Tampico through Saltillo to Torreon. In reporting 
on this cargo, The New York Times said: "How Villa got the munitions 
was not made known, but it was said that the task was accomplished 
79 
through the daring of some of Villa's lieutenants who went to Tampico 
32 
f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e . "  
A second known shipment for Villa arrived in Tampico in early 
33 
July. Leon J. Canova, another of the American agents sent to 
treat with revolutionary leaders by Wilson, reported that Carranza 
34 released this cargo to Villa on July 23, 1914. On July 31, yet 
another shipment of 2,000,000 rounds specifically consigned to Villa 
35 arrived at Tampico. From these reports, then, it was evident 
that Villa had ordered at least 6,000,000 rounds to be delivered 
through the port of Tampico; his source was in all probability the 
Charles R. Flint Company. Of these 6,000,000 cartridges, Villa 
received 4,000,000. 
It may have seemed inconsistent strategy on Carranza's part 
to allow Villa to receive these supplies; at a time when both men were 
determined to squash each other, it made little sense for Carranza to 
supply Villa. It appeared on the surface to indicate a lapse in his 
36 
reasoning. Several explanations might have justified these events. 
Carranza may not have exercised total control over Gonzalez, whose 
army held the port. Because Gonzalez promoted a reconciliation 
between Carranza and Villa, he may have felt that by allowing Villa 
to secure munition in June and July, he was working toward revolu­
tionary unity. 
80 
A second possible explanation grew from the fact that vast 
quantities of munitions were shipped from Flint and Company in New 
York during June, July, and August. Department of Justice agents' 
records indicated that a minimum of 13,000,000 rounds and 7,000 
rifles left New York City consigned for Galveston in those months. 
That Villa's agents dealt with Flint and Company has been shown. 
Assuming Villa made substantial purchases to be delivered to him 
through Tampico, Carranza's policy may have been directed towards 
placating Villa's worries. In permitting Villa to receive 4,000,000 
rounds, Carranza may have been able to gain access to far greater 
quantities consigned to Villa. If Carranza had refused to release the 
munitions which began to arrive in June, Villa would have diverted 
future shipments away from Tampico. Thus, by giving Villa a portion 
of his arms, Carranza may have gained more for himself—all free 
of charge. 
Finally, as The New York Times suggested, Villa raiders may 
have spirited this ammunition from Tampico to Torreon. However, 
since Gonzalez's troops held Tampico and Saltillo, they probably 
could not have accomplished this task without either Gonzalez's or 
Carranza's approval. 
Villa still devoted attention to his finances in the spring and 
summer. From the campaign against Zacatecas, he took 250,000 
38 dollars through forced loans and special taxes. Cattle provided his 
81 
greatest income in these months, however. Cobb noted that because 
of the ongoing revolution, most of the cattle in Chihuahua remained 
unbranded, making them impossible to identify and thus an easy mark 
for rustlers. Branded cattle would not have discouraged Villa in any 
case. Cobb reported that Villa contracted with J.E. Garrett of 
Corpus Christi, Texas to deliver 35,000 cattle; their arrangement 
called for 500,000 dollars to be paid to Villa—100,000 dollars of that 
39 
sum having been paid by July 24. The New York Times gave a far 
different account of this transaction. Their story said that Villa 
contracted with Garrett for the sale of 300,00 cattle for which 
5,000,000 dollars was to be paid. This money was to be divided 
between Villa and the Terrazas family, although the ratio o. the shares 
was unknown. It was possible both accounts were accurate since 
The New York Times story followed Cobb's report by two days. One 
deal might have followed another. However, since The New York Times 
account reported that as a stipulation of the contract, Luis Terrazas, 
Jr. was to be given his freedom and since this did not take place, 
40 
the accuracy of that story may be challenged. However, Villa 
received a substantial income from the sale of cattle in this time; 
how much was not clear. 
The sale of cotton provided another financial mainstay to Villa 
through the summer. Department of Justice agents reported that 
T.N. Solomon worked in El Paso for Villa selling the cotton taken 
82 
^ 41 from Torreon; he used the money to buy munitions. Villa's border 
agents evidently adhered to his prompting to sell cotton and other 
42 
confiscated goods at cutrate prices in order to attract buyers. In 
spite of various injunctions brought against the sale of the confiscated 
cotton, sales progressed. Canova reported that Villa's agents 
delivered the cotton to brokers in El Paso, receiving in exchange 
43 
approximately 50 percent of its market value. This policy drew 
the buyers Villa had anticipated. Thus through cattle sales, cotton 
sales, and export taxes levied against Chihuahua cattle companies, 
44 
Villa derived a healthy income through the mid-summer of 1914. 
Because of this financial stability and his need for American 
good will, he was able to adapt his policies to American government 
pressures. When his apointee, Fidel Avila, decreed on July 27, 1914 
that all mines must reopen or be subject to confiscation, the American 
government protested. Villa promised that the decree would not be 
45 
enforced. Rich men could afford to be magnanimous. By agreeing 
not to enforce this order, Villa gained additional prestige in the 
46 
American press and promoted his cause in the State Department. 
That summer he announced that all Spanish citizens who had not aided 
Huerta were free to return to their homes/7 Although few Spanish 
citizens risked returning to Villa-held regions, this action pleased 
the American government. 
83 
Even with the elimination of Huerta, Villa and Carranza showed 
no signs of disarming. Villa, as ever, knew the importance of good 
American relations to his military stockpiling program he carried on 
over the summer. By relenting on the mining decree in Chihuahua, 
he remained faithful to his design giving special treatment to Ameri­
cans above all other foreigners. At the same time he hinted that 
reconciliation between himself and Carranza would be aided by a 
48 
lifting of the embargo on munitions, a somewhat illogical argument. 
He continued to stress his willingness to mediate with Carranza to 
resolve their differences—as the State Department continually pressed 
him to do—yet all signs pointed to conflict. 
On the same day that Carranza decreed that no more munitions 
consigned to Villa could come to Tampico—presumably he would seize 
them—he requested that the United States institute an official embargo 
49 
on the border. Tensions mounted through July and by August the die 
had been cast. Bliss reported that the rebels in the vicinity of El Paso 
made strenuous and successful efforts to transport munitions across 
the border. Curiously enough, the remainder of the American-
Mexican border witnessed no such activity. For some reason, he 
observed, the rebels in Chihuahua were forced to import their muni­




Chihuahua had become a hotbed of military preparedness. 
Consul Letcher in Chihuahua City observed that Villa scoured the 
countryside for men and horses and rushed to import all the muni-
I 
tions he could buy. "Nobody here doubts the purpose of his activity." 
Carothers agreed with Letcher's report. He predicted that Villa's 
current campaign to import munitions foretold of a coming struggle 
with Carranza. Carothers also noted that as Villa built his army, 
Sommerfeld had been sent to New York City, presumably to buy more 
52 arms. 
By the fall of 1914, Villa's efforts to outfit his army had been 
quite successful. Having withdrawn from combat against Huerta's 
troops following the Zacatecas campaign, Villa concentrated his 
energy on fundraising, recruiting, and securing munitions for the 
coming battles. In all aspects, he succeeded. Canova described the 
array of Villa's might in mid-September. "After several months 
preparation" he noted, Villa, "if he does move south will go with one 
5 
hundred and sixty cars of provisions and the most ample equipment." 
Despite the various accords ironed out between Villa and Carranza— 
the Pact of Torreon, the Sonora truces—the new revolution could not 
54 
be averted. With troops numbering from 40,000 to 50,000 men and 
a well-stocked arsenal, Villa commanded the most powerful army of 
the revolution. His defeat merits close examination. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FROM SEPTEMBER TO CELAYA 
Villa Hesitates and Is Lost 
Until the end of 1914, Villa gradually increased his power; from 
the beginning of the new year until the battle of Celaya, he gradually 
lost it. After the battle of Celaya, Villa's fortunes took a dramatic 
downward turn. The impact of ordnance and supply to his demise, 
while not the key element in his reversal, played an important role. 
In a life and death struggle with Carranza, Villa's resources proved 
less substantial than his enemy's. 
At the outset of his fight with Carranza, Villa's supply system 
functioned with no visible weaknesses. In September and October he 
stationed his army in garrisons along the railroad line from Juarez 
south toward Aguascalientes. At Aguascalientes the revolutionary 
factions met in one final attempt to arrive at peace, but both Villa and 
1 
Carranza prepared for war. Villa's troops were well armed, well 
equipped and fairly enthusiastic. His stockpiling had built massive 
stores; he had 71 pieces of artillery, 75 machine guns, and an ammuni-
2 
tion supply of 20,000,000 rounds. He claimed all of his 40,000 troops 
3 
had Mauser rifles. Clearly, the embargo had failed. 
90 
The unofficial embargo had been lifted in September because of 
protests by the Shelton-Payne Arms Company. While it did little to 
deter smuggling, the unofficial embargo—which had been in force 
since April 23—allowed American officials to confiscate illegal 
cargoes of munitions bound for Mexico. The Shelton-Payne Company 
demanded to know by what law they were prevented from selling 
munitions to Mexico. Ironically, their protest was prompted by the 
seizure of two carloads of munitions bound for Villa's arsenal in 
Juarez. Collector Cobb impounded these munitions—515,000 rounds— 
in early August when Villa's agents attempted to bribe Customs guards 
•• 4 
to allow the arms to pass into Juarez. The protests of Shelton-Payne 
resulted in a ruling by the Attorney General that, because the Presi­
dent had not declared an embargo, there was no law to detain shipments 
5 
of munitions into Mexico. After September 8, 1914, the border had no 
restrictions on arms trade. This ruling undoubtedly aided Villa. 
Consul Blocker at Piedras Negras reported Villa had purchased 
6 
"practically all the output of the Remington gun factory." On 
October 6, 10,000 rifles went from El Paso to Juarez.7 
The repeated protests by Carranza calling for the closure of the 
8 
border failed. The New York Times reported a marked rise in arms 
g 
exports following the official opening of trade. With De La Garza 
and Sommerfeld in New York to arrange shipments and with Villa's 
substantial income, it was no wonder that trade boomed. Bliss 
91 
reported that "several million" cartridges crossed from El Paso to 
^  1 0  
Juarez in the first week of October. A week later, he submitted a 
11 
similar, if vague, report on ammunition shipments for Villa. Again, 
in early November, Bliss remarked that wholesale remitting of guns 
12 
and bullets to Mexico took place. Albeit imprecise, Bliss1 reports 
indicated the continued smooth running of Villa's supply system. 
With the failure of the convention at Aguascalientes to reconcile 
the revolutionary factions, the long-postponed fight began. The 
Convention, packed with Villa supporters, declared Carranza in 
13 
rebellion of November 10, 1914. For the next six weeks Villa and 
his allies enjoyed success on the battlefield while Carranza and his 
forces pulled back into strongholds at Tampico, Veracruz, and several 
cities along the northern border of Mexico. All observers expected 
Villa to crush Carranza especially because of the alliance Villa 
achieved with Emiliano Zapata, the commander of 25,000 rebels from 
14 
Morelos. 
Carranza, however, had several advantages not immediately 
apparent at the outset of the struggle. He held the port cities of 
Tampico and Veracruz where revenues from oil taxes enabled him to 
purchase munitions for his army. In addition, by having these ports, 
he had uninterrupted supply lines from the United States and Europe. 
Atkin believed that this proved to be a major factor in Carranza's 
15 eventual victory over Villa. By January, Carranza had collected 
92 
500,000 dollars worth of gold from oil taxes and frequently received 
arms shipments.^® 
More critical, perhaps, was the loyalty of the most able general 
that the revolution knew, Alvaro ObregcTn. Obregon cast his lot with 
Carranza when the Convention failed to bring peace. Longtime a 
leader of the Sonora rebels, Obregon had worked to bring reconcilia­
tion between Carranza and Villa; yet when men had to chose sides in 
November, Obregon supported Carranza. 7 Without Obregon, 
1 8 Carranza could not have defeated Villa and Zapata. 
To explain why Obregon sided with Carranza rather than Villa, 
Johnson believed Obregon simply felt he had to choose between the 
*13 lesser of two evils. Obregon's decision was probably influenced by 
20 
Villa's threats to kill him during the conferences in September. 
In any case, that decision proved decisive for Carranza's triumph. 
Although at the zenith of his power in late November and early 
December, Villa faced unforeseen obstacles which later contributed 
to his defeat. Perhaps foremost among them was his failure to seize 
the initiative and attack Carranza. Until the battle of Celaya, Villa 
pursued an ineffective war of attrition which only Carranza could win. 
Although the border remained open for Villa's purchases until October 
1915—just prior to American recognition of Carranza's de facto 
government—Villa's ability to pay for arms declined, particularly 
following his defeat at Celaya. Carranza controlled the oil taxes and 
93 
thus had a continuous income. Villa's income came from confisca­
tions and taxes (or forced loans) particularly on mining properties. 
Because the mines in Villa's territory were owned primarily by 
Americans, increased levys against them jeopardized cordial relations 
with the United States. By waiting, then, Carranza grew rich while 
21 
Villa grew more desperate for revenue. 
His inability to take advantage of his strength in November and 
attack Carranza at Veracruz cost him dealy as the months passed. 
To explain his hesitation, several other factors should be considered. 
Among other weaknesses, Villa's army was not as powerful as it 
seemed. His alliance with Zapata's army of 25,000 was more apparent 
than real. Zapata's troops took Puebla in mid-December, but they 
op 
held it only a short while. Thereafter, Zapata's influence on 
future military campaigns ended. The role he played was "purely 
negative;" Zapata "could only prevent actions by the enemy, he could 
23 
not compel them." This left Villa without the support of 25,000 
troops who were ineffective soldiers when they ventured outside their 
24 
patria chica, Morelos. 
The disintegration of the Convention government also hampered 
Villa's revolution and kept him from moving against Carranza. When 
part of the Convention government defected, they not only upset his 
administration but they took a bite out of his treasury—a severe blow to 
Villa's already weakening resources. Villa often professed a reluctance 
94 
to assume the Presidency of Mexico, yet he refused to be constrained 
by or supportive toward the revolutionary government which he 
nominally served under. Largely as a result of Villa's refusal to 
support the Convention, it fell into chaos. The inner conflicts of the 
Convention government proved to be decisively detrimental to Villa's 
25 cause. When the Convention government met in Mexico City and 
attempted to bring order, Villa permitted his troops and generals to 
do as they pleased despite his assurances to Convention President 
Gutierrez that he would abide by Gutierrez's decisions.^ Martin Luis 
Guzman accurately described the anarchy which prevailed in the city 
in mid-December: "What days those were, when murders and 
robberies were like the striking of a clock, marking the hours that 
27 
passed." By the end of December, Gutierrez threatened to leave 
the capital because he lacked the power to quell the ongoing vendettas 
28 
and pillaging. Villa left his campaign against the Carrancistas in 
Jalisco and returned to Mexico City where he agreed to subordinate 
his armies to the Convention government. These promises never 
materialized. By mid-January Gutierrez had endured enough. 
The announced reconciliation between Villa and Gutierrez did 
little to stem the chaos in Mexico City. In frustration with Villa, 
Gutierrez attempted to form an alliance with Obregon and Antonio 
Villa real, but these two generals rejected his plan and remained loyal 
29 to Carranza. When Villa discovered this plot, he gave orders that 
95 
Gutierrez should be killed. In mid-January Gutierrez, learning of 
30 
Villa's order, fled Mexico City. By this action, Villa lost not only 
part of the Convention leadership and the loyalty of several skilled 
generals—Jose Isabel Robles and Lucio Blanco among them—but half 
31 of the government's treasury. He could little afford to lose generals 
or money, particularly not 10,000,000 pesos. Having already lost 
Toribio Ortega in June, Villa's corps of competent generals ran 
32 
seriously low. 
A final factor contributing to Villa's hesitation to move against 
Carranza was Villa's concern for supply. Villa placed more impor­
tance in protecting his supply base in Chihuahua at the moment he had 
the opportunity to defeat Carranza. Like Zapata, Villa thought in 
terms of his patria chica. For him, Mexico was the northern 
33 
States. But he had more pragmatic reasons for focusing his attention 
on the north. Since October, the troops of Maclovio Herrera threatened 
34 
the region around Casas Grandes. In Durango, Domingo and Mariano 
Arrieta commanded armies loyal to Carranza and menaced Villa's 
35 
supply lines. Other pro-Carranza generals commanded garrisons 
at Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, and Matamoros; and all were well-
36 
fortified to withstand Villist attacks. These Carranza forces 
challenged Villa's domination of the north and threatened to cut him off 
from his source of supplies in the United States. 
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Villa continued to win victories in battles he led against 
37 
Carrancista forces, yet his staff commanders met with less success. 
His continued string of victories may have lulled him into a false sense 
of confidence; having never lost a major battle, he may have felt he 
could strike a decisive blow against Carranza whenever he wished. 
Villa probably had great respect for Obre^n's ability, and this respect 
made him more careful about preparations for battle. 
In January, events moved against Villa's cause. Manuel Chao 
38 
and Aguirre Benavides deserted him for Carranza. Puebla fell to 
39 
Obregon's army on January 6. By the end of the month, his army 
40 
occupied the capital. Villa's armies had taken Guadalajara in mid-
December only to evacuate a month later to the forces of General 
41 
Dominguez . His officers failed in the north. Stubborn resistance 
42 
at Ebano and Tampico kept that port under Carranza's control. 
By the middle of February, with the civil war at a military 
stalemate, Villa's financial foundations began to teeter. Consul 
Bonney at San Luis PotosT reported that General Urbina attempted 
to collect a forced loan from local merchants. This demand for 
43 
130,000 dollars did not exempt Americans. Although Urbina's later 
behavior showed that he may have been more concerned with lining 
his own pockets than in advancing the cause of the revolution, the 
incident demonstrated a need for funds and, perhaps, Villa's growing 
inability to control his subordinates. Later in February, Consul Davis 
97 
in Guadalajara—which had again been taken by Villist troops—reported 
that Villa demanded contributions from all the merchants of the city. 
44 Again, Americans were not exempted. Although Carothers secured 
promises from Villa that Americans in both places would not have to 
45 
pay, these actions foretold of Villa's financial instability. 
In March, Villa threatened to tax Americans again, this time in 
Monterey. He placed a million dollar levy on the Chamber of Commerce 
which he claimed was for the relief of the poor. His demand did not 
46 
exempt Americans. He relented on this demand after pressure from 
the State Department, yet he seemed more and more desperate as 
spring came. Indications of his financial distress were reflected in 
the decline of his fiat money. In January, his peso had dropped to 
47 
fourteen cents on the dollar—its lowest exchange rate since issuance. 
Villa threatened to confiscate mines in Chihuahua in mid-March 
unless they renewed production. In spite of earlier accords which 
guaranteed mining safety and provided Villa with 10 percent of mining 
48 profits, chaotic conditions hampered mining operations. Villa's 
frustration at being denied revenue resulted in the issuance of Decree 
Number 5, which required mines to begin operation or lose their 
titles. Carothers received Villa's promise that the Decree would not 




Reports from the border supported these findings. It was 
reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the revenues 
Villa amassed in late 1914 had already been spent to outfit his massive 
army. An army of 40,000 men with carbines, a supply of 20,000,000 
cartridges and other ordnance must have consumed a good portion of 
50 
Villa's reserves. His confiscations and forced loans of February 
and March supported this assumption. By early December, reports 
from the border indicated a drastic reduction in munitions which went 
from El Paso to Juarez. The vast shipments of October and November 
already detailed were no longer evident in the weekly reports from 
51 General Bliss. In January, February, and March these reports 
showed no munitions going from El Paso to Juarez. At the same time, 
the border towns of Laredo, Matamoros, and Douglas—all opposite 
Carrancists-held cities—imported substantial quantities of munitions 
52 according to these records. Thus it was clear that records of 
munition shipments were kept in these months, although just as clear 
that none came to Villa. 
Only at the beginning of April did Villa again start to receive 
munitions through El Paso. In the week ending April 4th, he received 
53 
4,464 carbines and 1,153,860 cartridges. The following week, 
54 
another 661 ,000 rounds and 1 ,555 rifles came to him through El Paso. 
It seemed inconsistent that in months when Villa's financial weakness 
seemed severe, he should suddenly begin to import vast lots of 
99 
munitions, especially since he had been unable to do so in the three 
months prior to this time. 
In late March, Hipolito Villa stayed in New York City where he 
55 
sought funds, apparently for munitions purchases. This fact will 
be shown later as a possible explanation for Villa's sudden resurgence 
of importing. 
The seeming purposelessness of Villa's campaigns in February 
and March may in part be explained by his need to gain ammunition 
and rifles that he could not secure through El Paso. The months of 
continuous fighting had most certainly claimed a large part of his 
reserve supplies. In mid-February, a report which substantiated 
this contention appeared. The New York Times reported that 8,500 
rifles and 4,000,000 rounds had arrived in San Diego, California via 
56 Galveston. The origin of this shipment had been New York City. 
Because Flint and Company had sent millions of rounds to Galveston 
through the summer of 1914 and because Villa's agents delt extensively 
with that company in past months, it was logical to assume the muni­
tions originated with Flint and Company. Because Carranza controlled 
Tampico and Veracruz, it was obvious that the shipment was destined 
for Villa. No other revolutionary leader at this time could have used 
such a large consignment. 
In late February, The New York Times linked Villa's actions on 
the west coast of Mexico to this shipment of arms. Villa had recently 
1 00 
retaken Guadalajara from the Carrancistas at this time, as noted 
earlier. The New York Times reported that Villa brought his army 
to the coast in order to be certain of receiving the 9,000 rifles and 
3,000,000 cartridges then in transit from San Diego to a Mexican 
57 
port, presumably somewhere near Manzanillo. Although this story 
gave a different tally for the quantity of munitions, it identified the 
58 shipment as being the same made to San Diego in late January. 
Carothers reported that Villa fought on the outskirts of Manzanillo 
59 
on February 19, 1915. The New York Times reported that Villa 
captured Zapotlan, a town on the way from Guadalajara, on February 20, 
1915.60 
However, Villa probably did not receive this shipment. His own 
0 -j 
memoirs attested to a critical shortage of munitions by late March. 
Villa probably left the coast before he could secure the munitions. 
Responding to the pleas of Felipe Angeles, Villa left the coast with 
62 
the main body of his army and moved toward Monterrey. He left 
General Urbina in charge of west coast operations. If the arms did 
land, they would probably have been taken by Urbina. Yet because 
Urbina's troops were badly mauled by Carrancista forces in late 
March, it was likely that had he received the ammunition, he lost most 
63 
of it in battle. Cumberland maintained that Villa occassionally 
received ammunition through Mexico City, yet it was doubtful that 
64 
these shipments could have amounted to much. 
101 
Thus by late March Villa's financial recourses and munitions 
were in short supply. The efforts of his subordinates to take Tampico 
from Gonzalez had failed and other drives to dislodge the Constitutiona-
65 
list forces from border garrisons had stalled. However, as March 
ended, the Carrancistas had not been able to decisively defeat Villa's 
00 troops either. This military stalemate changed in April at Celaya. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CELAYA AND THE AFTERMATH 
The Beginning of the End 
On the eve of the most decisive battle of the revolution, Villa's 
finances received another setback. Because of the protests of Ameri­
can stockmen, Villa's cattle sales through El Paso were substantially 
reduced in April.  ̂  By the end of the month, this trade had been almost 
completely shutoff. In agreeing to relent on the mining decree issued 
on March 15, Villa lost another revenue source, although he did 
arrange with the mining companies for the sale of his fiat currency 
2 to them in exchange for specie as a form of tax payment. 
Other difficulties beset him at this time. He protested to Duval 
West, an American envoy sent by President Wilson, that the Sante 
Fe Railroad no longer delivered coal to his troops; coal he purchased 
3 
had not been delivered. In his memoirs he claimed that he had 
purchased large quantities of munitions in March, but that his agents 
had difficulties "getting them into Mexico as Washington was not so 
4 
favorable as before." It was unclear what difficulties he referred to. 
This comment may have been made as a partial rationale for his 
defeat at Celaya which he blamed on a variety of factors dealing with 
munitions. In any case, only small quantities of munitions reached 
108 
him before the battle of Celaya. In contrast to the summer and fall 
of 1914, when Villa received ammunition in the millions of rounds 
every week, Sommerfeld and Hip^lito Villa managed to purchase only 
5 
750,000 rounds in March. 
Villa lost the battle at Celaya and six weeks later repeated in 
defeat at Leon. Villa stressed that he lost the battle of Celaya 
6 _ 
because he lacked ammunition. Before the battle of Leon, however, 
that excuse had been eliminated. Cobb reported from El Paso that 
from the time of the battle of Celaya until early May Villa received 
2,500,000 rounds and 3,500 rifles.7 A week later, still before the 
battle of Leon, 963 rifles and another 2,900,000 rounds of ammunition 
8 
came to Villa. Villa had sufficient weapons with which to equip his 
army at Leon. Yet he suffered a second massive debacle. By the 
time his army was in the process of being cut to shreds by Obregon's 
forces, more than 7,700,000 cartridges and 4,300 rifles had passed 
9 
from El Paso to Juarez. Although reported ammunition shortages 
may have explained his defeat at Celaya, they could not explain what 
happened at Leon. 
All signs pointed to a serious financial crisis concurrent with 
Villa's need for ammunition. His peso, which had dropped to fourteen 
cents on the dollar in January, continued to decline, reaching a value 
10 
of four and one-half cents on the dollar by April 24, 1915. By early 
May, Villa's agency had to pay exceedingly high rates for the 
109 
1 1 
ammunition that El Paso dealers sold. Thus, the buying power of 
his currency plummeted while prices he paid were increased. At a 
time when he had little income from cattle sales, when he had nego­
tiated and spent revenues from Torre'on's cotton, and when he had 
relented on forced loans, it seemed odd that Villa should suddenly 
receive huge lots of munitions. This situation became all the more 
difficult to explain in wake of the disaster at Celaya. An alternative 
resource must have supplied him. 
It was possible that Villa received help from German govern­
ment agents who were directly interested in promoting revolutionary 
factions in Mexico. While no irrefutable evidence can sustain the 
charges of German financing, many bits of circumstantial information 
led to just such a conclusion. In order to show this, the affairs of 
Felix Sommerfeld should be reexamined. 
According to Friedrich Katz, Sommerfeld had established a 
close rapport with Bernard Dernberg by May 1915. Dernberg worked 
as a propaganda agent for the German government in the United States 
12 
at this time. In the month of May, Dernberg wrote to Admiral 
Henning von Holtzendorff—who later forwarded the letter to German 
Foreign Secretary Von Jagow—suggesting the benefits to be derived 
from an American war with Mexico. Sommerfeld, Dernberg affirmed, 
pledged himself to work for whatever policy would best serve the 
13 
interests of Germany. 
1 1 0  
Further links between Sommerfeld and German agents were 
established earlier. In early April 1915, German Naval attache 
Karl Boy-Ed and Franz Rintelen von Kleist—the man who financed 
Huerta's attempted return to power in Mexico—were known to be 
meeting with Sommerfeld.^ By April 5, 1915, an account had been 
opened by Sommerfeld at the Mississippi Valley Trust Company in 
St. Louis. Two members of the German Embassy's staff opened 
accounts at the same bank at the same time. Department of Justice 
agents believed that these accounts were made to conceal payments 
15 from the German government to Sommerfeld. 
From Sommerfeld's account in St. Louis, 380,000 dollars was 
paid out to the Western Cartridge Company of Alton, Illinois from 
April 5, 1915 to December 1, 1915. All these purchases were con-
• 16 
signed to Hipolito Villa at El Paso. It was possible—but by no 
means proven—that additional arms came to Villa from the Simmons 
Hardware Company of St. Louis. Department of Justice agents 
reported that in July, while Remington had shipped no arms to the 
border for the past several months, Simmons Hardware had been 
sending "large quantities" to Mexico.^7 
No shipments came to Villa at Juarez from January until April. 
Sommerfeld had purchased, in four separate lots, 750,000 rounds of 
ammunition in March. Because "there is no evidence that the war in 
Europe made the slightest difference in the volume of munitions going 
111 
to Mexico," it was probable that if Sommerfeld had had money in 
1 8 
March, he would have purchased more supplies. It seemed clear 
that in March he lacked funding. If 20,000 dollars had purchased 
448,000 rounds of ammunition, then 380,000 dollars could have paid 
19 
for as many as 9,000,000 rounds. German funding could then have 
explained the sudden rise in the quantity of arms Villa received after 
April. 
If German aims were to provoke conflict between the United 
States and Villa, then this policy worked counter to that goal. Jagow's 
letter, responding to the suggestions made by Dernberg, affirmed that 
German interests would be served by an American-Mexican conflict. 
"It would be desirable," he wrote in May 1915, "that America, a 
good friend of the English, occupy itself in another war in order to 
20 
disinterest itself in Europe." German willingness to finance 
Mexican revolutionaries appeared plain. In April or May, 895,000 
dollars was given to the Huerta-Orozco alliance with hopes of 
21 
installing a pro-German government in Mexico. 
However, by supplying Villa with munitions at this stage of the 
revolution, they reduced their chances of provoking a conflict with 
the United States. Had they denied Villa supplies, it is certain his 
financial and military situation would have become much more critical 
after April and May. At that time, before the battle of Leon, he 
22 commanded from 20,000 to 30,000 troops. Because German aid— 
1 12 
assuming it was given—reduced Villa's immediate needs for munitions, 
it allowed him to relent on his confiscations and forced loans demanded 
from Americans. He did not provoke the United States because he did 
not need to. By March 16, 1916, he commanded 400 troops in the raid 
23 
on Columbus. Thus German aid may have contributed to forestalling 
Villa's attacks on the United States and certainly contributed to reliev­
ing Villa's need to exploit American interests in Mexico. Pershing's 
expedition against Villa would have been much different if Villa had 
commanded 20,000 men. 
24 The battle for Celaya marked Villa's rapid decline from power. 
Because this engagement and the subsequent conflict at Leon effectively 
ended Villa's military strength, the impact of ordnance on his defeats 
should be carefully weighed. From all descriptions of the battle, it 
seemed that Villa's supplies were less critical a factor than the 
tactics he employed. 
The fight featured Villa's forte, the furious headlong cavalry 
^ 25 
charge against Obregon's more scientific style of warfare. Obregon, 
unlike Villa, had studied trends of the Great War in Europe; he adapted 
26 
his strategy accordingly. With the advice of Colonel Maximilian 
Kloss, a German officer working on his staff, Obregon ordered that 
trenches be dug and barbed wire be stretched around the town of 
^ 27 
Celaya. Obregon had several weeks to prepare for Villa's attack. 
The broad plains surrounding Celaya made this tactic effective; with 
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supporting machine gun positions, Obregon's troops had well-
protected fortifications from which they mowed down the attacking 
28 
Villists. Eleven thousand men waited in Celaya for the expected 
pq 
Villa assault on April 6, 1915. 
At the outset of the battle, ammunition for attacking troops was 
in short supply. Yet nothing compelled Villa to attack. Obregon 
refused to move forward against Villa's army because he faced 
3( 
superior numbers of troops and because he had built strong defenses. 
Villa ignored the sage counsel of General Felipe Angeles to postpone 
attack, thereby allowing reinforcements to arrive and forcing Obregon 
into the open plains where his troops would have been more vulnerable. 
Had Villa done this, more ammunition would have reached his troops 
and, perhaps, in spite of his tactics, he may have come away from 
Celaya in better military strength. Still, in consideration of his 
repeated refusal to modify his tactics of frontal assault—as witnessed 
at Leon and Agua Prieta—Villa's delay probably would have made 
little difference in the long run. 
Estimates of Villa's losses varied according to which side 
submitted the report. Villa at first claimed that his army had won a 
31 
smashing victory but later admitted to defeat. The Carranza 
authorities reported a giant triumph. On April 15, they reported they 
had taken thousands of rounds of ammunition, thirty cannon, and 
32 
thousands of prisoners. Later they claimed Villa lost 14,000 dead 
114 
33 
and 8,000 prisioners. Whatever the exact tally, Villa troops were 
brutally massacred. In one day of head-first charges, 2,000 Villists 
34 
were slain. 
Villa attributed his loss in part to his eagerness to strike a blow 
^ 35 against Obregon. More frequently he blamed defeat on a lack of 
ammunition."^® In light of the records from the border and stories 
detailing the urgent efforts of his agents in New York to rush ammuni-
37 
tion to the border, this claim was no doubt accurate. His troops 
had only eighteen rounds each by April 13—scant supplies indeed for 
O O  
the bloody fighting at Celaya. Villa found other reasons for his 
defeat: green recruits who ran away from their first combat 
39 
experience and cowardly ex-Federal officers who served in his 
40 
ranks. Still, he harped continuously upon the issue of munition 
41 
shortages. 
The battle of Leon, pitting the same armies in renewed combat 
in late May and early June left Villa without this explanation. Rein­
forced with additional troops and munitions, Villa met defeat once 
42 
more. Immediately after his defeat at Celaya, great lots of 
ammunition began arriving at his temporary headquarters in 
Aguascalientes. By April 19, he had received from 3,000,000 to 
43 
10,000,000 rounds. In early May, 3,500 new rifles had been sent 
44 
to his army. Villa had 15,000 troops with him at Aguascalientes 
in late April; at that time, he called up his reserves from the north 
115 
to reinforce him. By the beginning of the battle, he commanded 
46 
between 25,500 and 30,000 men. He did not appear to be lacking 
for military stores. 
Johnson contended that Villa was again critically short of ammuni­
tion for the battle of Leon, but the records from the border shipments 
disputed this. Reports from Carothers, Schmutz, and Cobb showed 
47 «• 
that this was not the case. The reason he lost again at Leon had 
little to do with munitions; Villa had simply learned nothing from his 
encounter at Celaya. When explaining his attitude to Angeles before 
the battle of Leon—when Angeles again cautioned Villa to adopt a 
defensive campaign—Villa refused to listen, saying, "I am a man who 
came into this world to attack. If I am now defeated by attacking 
48 
today, I will win by attacking tomorrow." Rejecting Angeles' 
advice, Villa opened another massive assault against Obregon's 
Army of Operations on June 1 , 1915. The results were similar to 
Celaya. By June 6, the battle had ended; Villa's army had been 
49 ^ 
crushed. Villa allowed his passionate hatred for Obregon—of whom 
he once said, "I would rather be beaten by a Chinese than by Obregoh"— 
50 
to overcome sound military reasoning. The Constitutionalists 
claimed 10,000 killed, wounded, or captured Villista troops at the 
51 
end of the battle . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Relationship of Munitions to Villa's Demise 
None of the news following the battle of Leon was good news for 
the Villistas. Perhaps the most critical result of his defeats in the 
early summer of 1915 was the loss of popular support from the 
Mexican people. Later in his career when he eluded Pershing's 
Expedition, he would regain the admiration of the people, but at the 
end of the battle of Leon this was not the case. ̂  The invincible 
General of the Division of the North no longer possessed his aura of 
victory. 
His once massive army started to disintegrate. By July, when 
he began his retreat northward to his home bases in Chihuahua, 
fewer than 10,000 troops remained under his command with desertions 
2 
from his ranks becoming commonplace. In desperation, he recruited 
teenagers and women to fight in his army; he increased the enlistment 
3 
bonus to ten pesos. Still his soldiers left him. The rapid decline 
in his currency made enlistment bonuses meaningless; but even with 
monetary inducement, it was unlikely that people would join him any­
way. A long revolution and Villa's stunning defeats had cut into 
4 
popular zeal to serve with him. As prices in Villist-controlled 
121 
territory soared and the value of his fiat money lost its worth, food 
shortages followed by hunger riots broke out in Chihuahua and Durango. 
This single factor, more than any other, created popular animosity 
5 
against Villa. If, as Johnson believed, men fought for leaders more 
than causes in this revolution, Villa's losses had crippled his prestige. 
Men did not fight for a defeated general.6 
Munitions continued to flow to his agency in Juarez, yet he had 
fewer and fewer troops who would be able to use them. Now that 
Villa's triumphs had ended, his generals and agents became more 
concerned with personal gain than with the cause of the Division of 
the North. Carothers reported in late June that "military commanders 
everywhere are grafting to the full extent of their ability.1,7  His agents 
in El Paso and Juarez stole from Villist funds for their own purposes 
g 
just as did his field generals. 
As he retreated northward, Villa ransacked towns for food and 
supplies. Wherever he took his army he demanded that his worthless 
currency be accepted as legal tender and he set high taxes on anyone 
9 
who still had "real" money. He kept to this pattern at Aguascalientes 
10 
in June and at Chihuahua, Durango, and Torreon in July and August. 
These actions did little to bolster his fighting strength; his soldiers 
11 — had had enough battles. All the while the army of Obregon moved 
gradually north forcing Villa from Aguascalientes to Torreon to 
Chihuahua. By mid-September, the evacuation of Torreon was 
122 
1 2  
underway. By the end of the month, his army prepared to withdraw 
13 
from Chihuahua, too. 
Curiously, throughout the latter part of the summer and fall 
arms continued to flow from El Paso to Juarez. From June 1 until 
14 mid-July, Villa received more than 7,000,000 cartridges. After 
July 15, Villa received large weekly shipments of munitions until 
mid-September. Between July 15 and September 8, 1915, an additional 
15 
4,300,000 rounds came to Juarez. In this same space of time, only 
260 carbines were imported, which suggested that Villa had fewer 
1 0 
troops to arm or less money to buy weapons with. The imports in 
June, July, and August supported the argument that Villa received 
outside financing, possibly from German sources. The weakness of 
his financial condition had already been shown. By early May, the 
17 
Madero family no longer backed him. In the light of the widespread 
grafting, it seemed unlikely that the money which paid for these arms 
came from the Villa agency on the border. Thus, though fighting 
a losing campaign, he continued to receive munitions in bulk—from 
July 1 to mid-September 12,000,000 rounds came to his army. His 
defeats after Celaya had to have another cause than the lack of ammuni­
tion. In addition, this information disputed Quirk's belief that Villa's 
actions—increasing confiscations and arbitrary taxation—after June 
18 
resulted from Villa's great need for more arms and ammunition. 
123 
Abruptly in mid-September, imports of munitions fell sharply. 
In the two weeks prior to the renewal of the embargo on October 9, 
^ 19 
1915, total imports to Juarez were only 8,300 cartridges. 
In spite of his numerous setbacks following Celaya and L^on, 
until the American recognition of Carranza's de facto government, 
Villa's policy continued to favor American interests in Mexico. Amid 
confiscations of the summer and fall, Villa often threatened to tax 
Americans or to confiscate their property; but he always relented on 
the demands he issued. In late July, he decreed that all merchants of 
Chihuahua turn their wares over to his troops; foreigners were to be 
reimbursed with Villa currency while Mexicans were not so lucky. 
20 Villa confiscated Mexican goods as a "contribution to the revolution." 
In conference with General Hugh Scott and George Carothers a week 
21 
later, Villa agreed to return all the merchandise. 
Villa had also decreed on July 26 that all mine and smelter 
owners were to meet at Chihuahua City on August 9; he intended that 
22 
they should pay him a 300,000 dollar loan. The owners feared that 
Villa might implement the notorious Decree Number 5 and confiscate 
23 
their property if they did not heed his demands. Villa relented 
again, agreeing not to demand the money; grateful owners donated 
24 1 ,000 tons of coal to his army. 
Several explanations can be given suggesting why Villa behaved 
this way. General Scott believed that Villa cooperated with American 
124 
demands simply out of faith in United States intentions not to recog-
25 
nize Carranza and out of his friendship for General Scott. Fearing 
American recognition of Carranza, with the certain closing of the 
border, Villa probably wished to keep the cordial ties which gave him 
access to supplies. It was shown that in July and August and until 
mid-September, large supplies of munitions were bound to him from 
the United States. These munitions were vulnerable to seizure in the 
event Villa followed through on his threats. 
Villa's continued cooperation fit into American efforts to mediate 
the revolution. Not wishing to recognize Carranza, the United States 
government worked to keep Villa afloat financially as a balancing 
26 
against Carranza's power. Through the efforts of Secretary of 
State Lansing, Villa received permission to export slaughtered beef 
27 
into El Paso in early August. This was part of a plan whereby 
a mediated peace could be achieved without Carranza becoming 
28 
President. 
A final American attempt to arrange a mediated settlement 
eliminating Carranza began in mid-August. General Scott received 
permission to contact Alvaro Obregon in hopes of forming an alliance 
29 < 
which excluded Carranza. Obregon remained loyal to Carranza, 
30 
the plan collapsed and Scott returned to Washington. The plan 
indicated just how far the American administration was willing to go 
to install any leader except Carranza as Mexico's President. This 
125 
policy favored Villa who had shown himself pliable to American 
requests; in doing so he received financial rewards. 
Villa's open hostility to American firms after the recognition of 
Carranza correlated with the closing of the border and the end of his 
purchases of munitions. Orders came from Washington on October 9, 
1915 to halt shipments of arms; but as has been shown, Villa's ship-
31 
ments four weeks prior to that date had all but ended. 
* 
The sale of confiscated goods from Juarez to El Paso continued 
throughout September and well beyond the closing of the border for 
munition exports. Villa's agency continued to sell goods—receiving 
100,000 dollars cash in one week in September—however, the 
increased rampant grafting on the part of agents reduced the effective-
32 
ness that this organization had in delivering supplies to Villa. 
By early October, Villa's attitude toward Americans changed. 
Americans could no longer count on exemptions from Villa's decrees. 
He took 1 ,000 head of cattle from the Corralitos Cattle Company; in 
33 
past times, he merely taxed them. In early November, as his 
remaining troops moved to Sonora to regroup with the forces of Jose 
Maria Maytorena, Villa demanded forced loans of 25,000 dollars from 
34 four American mining companies. He did not relent in his demands. 
Clearly, Villa had ended his pro-American favoritism. 
Villa boasted to the American press on October 9, 1915 that he 
commanded an army of 40,000 men, all well-armed and anxious to 
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fight. His claims of being well-armed were no doubt accurate. His 
claims of having 40,000 motivated troops were greatly overstated. 
36 
Cobb reported that Villa led an army of 7,000. In any case, those 
37 
he led were disheartened and deserting in droves. By the end of his 
third disaster at Agua Prieta—where he ordered his troops to their 
deaths in the same style as he did at Celaya and Leon—his agents in 
38 El Paso were being sued by suppliers. 
Clendenen maintained that when the United States recognized 
39 Carranza Villa still comanded a "formidable" army. He still had 
as many as 10,000 troops and sufficient munitions. His army though 
was hardly the fighting force it had once been. His soldiers were 
40 
dispirited and his officers clamored for an end of combat. Desei— 
tions, formerly the problem for opposing armies, now had become 
rampant within Villist ranks. Many of his best generals left him 
41 
seeking asylum in the United States. 
The difference that arms supplies made in Villa's campaigns 
seemed less significant in the latter stages of the revolution than they 
did in the opening months of his drive against Huerta. The friendly 
American border gave him easy access to munitions enabling him to 
equip the men who flocked to join the Division of the North. His army 
had grown to over 40,000 men by the beginning of January. As he 
built his army, his access to cotton, cattle, and other forms of wealth 
expanded. This enabled him to purchase additional supplies to arm 
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additional men. In sum, Villa's strength steamrolled forward in the 
first year and a half of his campaign. The arms he gained certainly 
propelled his rise to power. Yet the key to his success was his ability 
to draw men to fight with him. Without troops, no amount of muni­
tions Villa secured would have won battles. 
Men joined Villa in part because he epitomized the caudillo 
tradition in Mexico. He boldly led his soldiers into battle, showing 
all that he was more of a man than anyone else. Fearless in the 
fight, adept with women, horses, and guns, Villa possessed the 
charismatic qualities essential for drawing recruits. He was "virile 
(in Mexico, muy macho) earthy, passionate, given to emotional out-
42 
bursts." These traits coupled with his fierce hatred of his foes 
helped to explain both his success and failure. 
The second explanation for his successes and failures was the 
way in which he directed the forces he commanded. His tactic of 
direct frontal assault served him well against the unenthusiastic and 
43 
largely conscripted army of Huerta. His troops, confident of 
victory, responded to his orders. Their massed charges won battles 
at Ojinaga, Torreon, and Zacatecas. By the spring of 1915, those 
tactics proved ineffective, yet Villa refused to adapt to the new circum­
stances he faced. He fought a more determined and enthusiastic 
enemy—which was well-led and well-supplied. He had never been 
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defeated. Then he had the largest and most well-equipped army, yet 
he lost. His repeated squandering of men cost him victory. 
Villa claimed he lost the battle of Celaya because he lacked 
ammunition. Records of arms shipments supported that assertion. 
However, the same records showed that large quantities of munitions 
came to his army following the battle and throughout the remainder of 
the summer months. Villa's weaknesses were not supplies but in 
how he used the forces he had. Impatient for victory—although under 
no pressure to attack—Villa charged ahead. By waiting, he was assured 
of more men and more munitions and better artillery support. His 
44 armies might have been able to take Tampico if Villa had delayed. 
Villa's lack of ammunition ended before the battle of Leon. 
Large supplies reached him along with reinforcements, but he achieved 
the same result. His army rushed into the teeth of well-prepared 
defenses and were massacred. No matter how well-provisioned, 
few armies can sustain themselves fighting in that manner. No 
commander can waste thousands of soldiers in repeated attempts to 
dislodge an enemy. This second defeat broke the confidence of his 
troops. Now it was Obreg*on who was undefeated, the supreme 
caudillo. Villa had been soundly beaten, something which men who 
lead by charisma can ill afford. Without a will to fight, the army 
crumbled. Ironically, as this process took place, munitions flowed 
to his army. 
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This flow of munitions suggested that the German government 
may have backed Villa as early as April 1915. Research by Michael 
Meyer confirmed that the Germans were involved in financing Huerta's 
45 
attempted return to power in the spring of 1915. Barbara Tuchman 
showed the German interest in supporting the Carranza government in 
a possible war with the United States on the eve of American entry in 
the First World War. The Germans were obviously working to support 
any faction which might occupy the United States in conflict, and thus 
keep America out of the European struggle. If the Germans supplied 
Villa with munitions in the spring of 1915, as this preliminary research 
indicates, it was certainly consistent with their intrigues with Huerta 
and Carranza. 
46 
During the summer of 1915, Villa lost the support of the people. 
Without their backing, he could not mount an army. Oddly, it was 
Carranza who best summarized the relationship between munitions and 
Villa's successes. In an interview at Veracruz on August 31 , a 
journalist asked Carranza if an embargo on munitions from the United 
States would shorten the revolution. "I do not think so," Carranza 
said, "as we had to start against Huerta without arms when Huerta 
had immense supplies of all kinds of munitions. He was defeated in 
spite of that fact, the very evident reason being that the Constitutiona-
47 
lists had the people supporting their movement." It was not a shortage 
of munitions which kept Villa from triumph, it was rather his rash 
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direction of the massive force he commanded. Having Tost at Celaya 
and Leon, he lost the confidence and support of the Mexican people. 
Without this, no amount of ammunition mattered. 
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